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Gulf of Oman: Dryad Maritime publishes vessel incident update and analysis

Attacks on tankers deepen tensions between Iran and the US, which have gradually escalated in 2019.

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UK-based specialist maritime operations company Dryad Maritime on Thursday (13 June) released an incident update and analysis report focusing on the recent attack of a crude oil tanker and a chemical tanker at the Gulf of Oman:

Reports indicate that two vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz in South Easterly course were attacked, in an incident which is still being investigated. The two vessels involved have been identified as the crude oil tanker Front Altair and the chemical tanker Kokuka Courageous. Front Altair is Marshall Islands flagged, and Kokua Courageous Panama-flagged. The Front Altair is believed to be carrying 75,000 tons of Naptha originating from Abu Dhabi’s ANDOC. The Kokuka Courageous is believed to be carrying methanol, originating from Saudi’s Sabic and also Qatar. Front Altair’s speed is reported to have dropped from 12 kts at 0205 UTC, to 2.7 kts at 0321 local time, indicating the time of incident. Reporting indicates that a distress signal was reportedly sent by the vessel Hyundai Dubai at 0612UTC on behalf of the Front Altair. Kokua Courageous’ speed is reported to have dropped from 14 kts at 0133 UTC, to 0.2 kts at 0620 UTC with a distress signal being received at 0700 UTC. Front Altair’s position when it lost speed significantly was at N 25° 26’ 27.13, E 057° 23’ 18.42, at 0248 UTC.

Front Altair was believed to be fully laden when the attack took place, resulting in a large fire and the crew being forced to abandon ship. Reports indicate that the cargoship Hyundai Dubai aided in the rescue effort.

Reporting suggests that 21 members of crew have been evacuated from Kokua Courageous, and the crew are believed to have reported that its cargo of methanol is intact. Additional but unconfirmed reports have been received by Dryad sources indicating that IRGC vessels were the first vessels on scene to offer assistance. It is believed that this assistance was refused by the crew of the Front Altair, however unconfirmed reporting indicates that the crew of the Kokuka Couragous may have been taken to the Iranian Port of Bandar-e-Jask.

Both vessels appear to have indicated that they believe the attack originated from the surface, however further reports from the Front Altair indicate that the hull was breached on the starboard side partially below the waterline.

The incident was initially primarily reported by the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and the US 5th Fleet, which is believed to be in attendance at the scene.

Front Altair’s current position as reported by AIS is N 25° 22’ 59.21, E 057° 23’ 53.65, at 0945 UTC. Kokua Courageous’ current position is reported to be 50 km East of Front Altair.

Iranian media reports have claimed that Front Altair has sunk, however Frontline which operates the vessels has denied that this is the case at 0957 UTC.

Context

This latest incident has occurred one month and a day from the previous incidents where four vessels were targeted within the Fujairah anchorage. The latest incident has caused a steep price rise in oil, and Brent Crude has rose 3.85%, standing at $62.28 USD as at 1153 UTC.

Assessment

Incidents of this nature in relative close proximity are extremely worrying, and are indicative of rising tensions in the region. On a broader regional scale, the attack will serve to deepen tensions between Iran and the US, which have gradually escalated throughout 2019.

It is a realistic possibility that Iran or a proxy were behind this attack, however the situation remains fluid and there are a number of competing naratives that require examining. It is important to note that the attack on the Front Altair is reported to have struck the starboard side of the vessel, which was travelling in a southerly direction. Any Iranian involvement either directly or via a proxy is unlikely to have conducted an attack from the port side, as this would immediately give rise to allegations of Iranian shore launch projectiles would require Iran to refute blast diagnostic evidence from the outset. Thus far the methodology of a starboard side attack is consistent with what would be expected of Iranian involvement. The reported involvement of Iranian vessels in the rescue effort may also be an attempt to obscure intent in the aftermath of the attack however this cannot be confirmed.

However, any assessment of Iranian involvement must be contextualised, and must be analysed through the prism of self-interest and motive. States such as Iran are rational actors, and will not conduct attacks in the Strait of Hormuz merely to ‘disrupt’ global shipping, without there being a clear national interest in doing so. At a time where the Iranian economy is struggling and sanctions are biting, it seems surprising that Iran would endeavour to conduct such a bellicose strategy. It would also be remarkable that Iran would knowingly target vessels reported to be carrying ‘Japan-related cargo’ at the same time that the Japanese Prime Minister Abe is conducting talks in Iran. These inconsistencies in terms of interest and motive do not rule out Iranian involvement, but they do suggest that a wider regional narrative may be at play, and that the responsible party could in fact not be Iranian once a further investigation is completed. It is important to note that despite recent events pointing to Iranian involvement, no key lines of evidence indicating responsibility or intent have been identified. Whilst the security threat which the incident poses can be quantified and responded to, the underlying details are still emerging, and will continue to be assessed by Dryad.

In the short term, the threat to vessels in the Strait of Hormuz has undoubtedly risen, however this is still a localised event, and is likely not to be part of a pattern of events which will develop in the next 72 hours. Dryad deems that the threat from this event does not span into the wider Gulf of Oman, and vessels transiting through the Gulf are deemed to be safe. Vessels are advised to follow BMP5 best practice, and request routinely updated security briefings, when transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

Source: Dryad Maritime
Published: 14 June, 2019

 

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Business

IBT Bunkering & Trading appoints Kevin Döhmen to lead Singapore expansion

Döhmen will lead the new Singapore office, with responsibility for managing and developing the operation and strengthening relationships with customers and partners.

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IBT Bunkering & Trading appoints Kevin Döhmen to lead Singapore expansion

Hamburg-based marine fuels firm IBT Bunkering & Trading on Wednesday (12 August) said it has appointed Kevin Döhmen as Executive Vice President to lead the company’s new Singapore office. 

Manifold Times previously reported the company announcing that it is opening its doors in Singapore and will be running a trading desk in the city-state after trading bunkers out of Hamburg since 1976.

The company said Kevin Döhmen will lead the new Singapore office, with theresponsibility for managing and developing the operation and strengthening relationships with customers and partners.

IBT said the Singapore office represents an important first step in strengthening its presence in Asia.

“At the same time, we are actively exploring further opportunities to expand our activities and establish new partnerships in this key maritime hub,” the company said. 

Döhmen said: “Singapore is the heartbeat of global bunkering. Bringing IBT’s Hamburg roots — 50 years of them — onto the ground in this hub is a real privilege, and I couldn’t be more ready for it.”

IBT said it will maintain the service approach established through its Hamburg operations while building its activities in Singapore.

The company described the move as bringing together its Hamburg roots and Singapore presence through a global bunker network. 

Related: German firm IBT Bunkering & Trading establishes Singapore presence, adds second trading desk

 

Photo credit: IBT Bunkering & Trading
Published: 13 August, 2026

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Bunker Alerts

Low flashpoint found in Indonesia bunker fuels, alerts Maritec-Naias

Firm tested eight bunker samples representing LSMDO and B40 fuel grade from vessels that took fuel oil /bunkered in Indonesia ports, which indicated flashpoints as low as 39.5°C.

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Bunker fuel testing and marine surveying business Maritec-Naias on Wednesday (12 August) issued an alert regarding bunker samples from vessels that took fuel oil/bunkered in Indonesia showing flashpoints as low as 39.5°C:

During the period of 21 July to 04 August 2026, Maritec-Naias tested eight bunker samples representing Low Sulfur Marine Distillate Oil (LSMDO) and B40 fuel grade from vessels that took fuel oil /bunkered in Indonesia ports, which indicated Flashpoints as low as 39.5°C.

All eight fuel samples tested were sourced from a single supplier.

Regulatory Implications:

Based on the results of the eight samples tested, the fuels do not comply with the minimum flashpoint requirement of 60 °C set by SOLAS and ISO 8217.

As per SOLAS requirements, the minimum flashpoint of any fuel carried in the tanks of a ship should be not less than 60 °C (with exception of fuel for lifeboats, which can be grade DMX with a flash point min of 43 °C).

ISO 4259 interpretation for tested flashpoint temperature is not taken into consideration here as the safety of onboard crew and vessel is of higher precedence.

Since 01 May 2024, it has been a MARPOL Annex VI requirement that the Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) includes either the actual flashpoint of a fuel as supplied or a declaration that its flashpoint has been determined as being at or above 70°C.

From 1 January 2026, SOLAS amendments clarified that the flashpoint requirement applies to fuels, which were specifically intended to have a flashpoint not less than 60°C as required under SOLAS II‑2/2.1.1 These amendments now align with MARPOL by requiring flashpoint details to be recorded on the BDN. Additionally, prior to bunkering, suppliers must provide the ship’s representative with a signed declaration confirming that the fuel meets the SOLAS flashpoint standard.

MARITEC-NAIAS RECOMMENDATIONS

When ordering fuels from Indonesia it is advised to insist on getting the actual flash point values from the supplier. If your vessel has bunkered a low flashpoint fuel it is prudent to observe/implement the precautions below:

  • Flame screens on tank vents should be maintained in good condition and there should be no sources of ignition in the vicinity of the vents. This will assist in safe natural ventilation of volatile components in the fuel.
  • No Smoking, no naked flame and no hot work must be allowed at any areas near to tank air vents.
  • Send additional tank(s) samples upon arrival in port to check the fuel properties and flash point results especially if there has been co-mingling of fuels in bunker tanks
  • If the vessel is out at sea, it may be possible to obtain dispensation from your Flag State Administration up to the next arrival port.
  • Put the supplier on notice promptly and notify your P&I club.

 

Photo credit: Shaah Shahidh on Unsplash
Published: 13 August, 2026

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Methanol

China: Xiamen issues safety guidelines for methanol bunkering operations

New guidelines establish safety requirements across the full methanol bunkering process, supporting the expansion of green marine fuel supplies at Xiamen Port.

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Xiamen, China

Xiamen Free Trade Zone on Monday (10 August) said its Administrative Committee recently jointly issued the Safety Guidelines for Marine Methanol Fuel Bunkering in Xiamen Waters with Xiamen Port Authority and Xiamen Maritime Safety Administration, establishing a framework for methanol bunkering operations in the port.

The guidelines are the first safety operating standard in Fujian province specifically covering marine methanol fuel bunkering. They apply to methanol bunkering operations conducted by bunker vessels in Xiamen waters and set out safety requirements covering the entire operation, from preparation through completion.

The guidelines specify requirements for bunkering companies, equipment and materials used on bunker vessels, hose inspection intervals, personnel certification and personal protective equipment.

They also require operators to conduct dedicated risk assessments and prepare emergency response plans before operations begin. During bunkering, operators must maintain continuous monitoring and comply with specified weather restrictions. After completion, pipelines must undergo procedures including purging and inerting.

Xiamen Port has previously carried out ship-to-ship bunkering of biofuels and LNG. The new guidelines provide a regulatory framework and operational basis for methanol bunkering and are intended to support the safe and orderly conduct of such operations.

The move is also expected to help Xiamen Port expand its market and bunkering capacity for green marine fuels. 

 

Photo credit: Woo Winter on Unsplash
Published: 13 August, 2026

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