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BIMCO CII Clause for Time Charters – The dust begins to settle

Three lawyers explain on BIMCO CII Clause for Time Charters, the obligations, highlight themes emerging from the industry’s reaction to the clause, and impact on the industry so far.

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The following is an article written by three Reed Smith shipping lawyers explaining the International shipping association (BIMCO) CII Clause for Time Charters, the obligations, highlights themes emerging from the industry’s reaction to the clause, and the impact on the industry so far:

By Reed Smith transportation lawyers Nick Austin, Mike Adamson and Laura Hyne 

Just as there is no easy route to decarbonisation, there is no straightforward way of balancing a shipowner’s obligation to comply with the MARPOL Carbon Intensity Indicator (“CII”) Regulations with a time charterer’s right to direct the employment of a vessel.

That much is clear from the long-awaited BIMCO CII Operations Clause for Time Charters 2022 and, more tellingly, from the industry reaction.

Now that the dust is settling: what does the clause actually say? What are the key sticking points? And how are owners and charterers positioning themselves before the CII Regulations come into force on 1 January 2023? In this briefing, we take a closer look at some of the emerging themes.

The BIMCO CII Operations Clause for Time Charter Parties 2022

Messaging from both BIMCO and the IMO has long been that, for the CII Regulations to be effective, owners and charterers will need to work together. This principle of co-operation is at the heart of the clause.

Under sub-clause (b), the parties are obliged to ‘cooperate and work together in good faith’ to: (i) share best practices that may improve the vessel’s energy efficiency and; (ii) collect, share and report on a daily basis any relevant data that may assist the monitoring and assessment of the vessel’s compliance with the CII Regulations and for planning prospective voyages. This, at least, should not be a point of contention because the very essence of the CII Regulations require this.

Charterers’ obligations

The key point is that the clause transfers the responsibility for compliance with the CII Regulations from the owner to the charterer.

Sub-clause (c) sets out the two main obligations on the charterer:

  1.   To operate and employ the vessel in a manner consistent with the CII Regulations.
  2.   To operate and employ the vessel in a manner which will not permit the “C/P Attained CII” (i.e. the vessel’s CII attained at the start of the year or the delivery date if this was in the middle of a year) to exceed the “Agreed CII” (i.e. the CII value which the parties agree in the clause will be met).

The Agreed CII must be stated in sub-clause (d) and this will be a key area of negotiation. Without agreement, the clause defaults to the middle point of ‘C’. For many vessels, this could curb the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by time charterers because they may have to issue adjusted voyage orders (to slow steam or sail by a more fuel efficient route) to comply.

Sub-clause c(ii) says “Any existing warranties as to despatch, speed and consumption or to maintain the Vessel’s description” continue to apply. A charterer will therefore retain the right to claim against the owner for breach of those warranties. However, a charterer must still comply with its other obligations under the clause, even if the owner is in breach of the warranties.  In other words, a charterer is not excused from its obligations if, for example, the vessel underperforms.

Owners’ obligations

The main obligation for the owner is at sub-clause (f). It must exercise due diligence to ensure that the vessel is operated in a manner, which minimises fuel consumption, including the following:

  1.   Maintaining the vessel, its engines, hull and any equipment relating to its energy efficiency in accordance with the charter and to report any deficiencies.
  2.   Adjusting the vessel’s trim and optimising main and auxiliary engine use.
  3.   Making optimal use of navigational equipment and performance monitoring systems.
  4.   Proceeding on the most fuel efficient route (subject to the safety of the vessel and charterers’ instructions).
  5.   Monitoring data relevant to calculating the vessel’s carbon intensity.
  6.   Compliance with the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).

What about non-compliance?

Sub-clause (g) says what happens if the data collected by the owner indicates that the trajectory of the C/P Attained CII is deviating from the Agreed CII.

In short, if, after the owner has given advance warning of such deviation to the charterer, there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the charterer will not be able to comply with its obligations under sub-clause (c), the charterer must submit, at the owner’s request, a plan showing its instructions for at least the next voyage.

Then, if the owner can reasonably show that following this plan will result in the vessel failing to meet the Agreed CII, it must notify the charterer, and the parties must work together in good faith to agree an adjusted plan to bring the C/P Attained CII in line with the Agreed CII.  

Until an adjusted plan is agreed, the owner need not follow the charterer’s orders and can require the charterer to provide alternative instructions to bring the vessel back within the C/P Attained CII.

The vessel is to remain on hire following the owner’s request for a written plan until such plan is agreed and, during that time, the owner will not be in breach of charter if it takes the above steps to bring the vessel within the C/P Attained CII. In theory this could lead to a stalemate if a plan cannot be agreed. However, given the vessel will be off hire, the charterer should be incentivised to agree a compromise as quickly as possible.

There is also an express right at sub-clause (j) for the owner to claim damages caused by any failure by the charterer to comply with the clause.

Observations

A number of themes are starting to emerge from the industry’s reaction to the clause.

The nature of the key obligations

Under the clause, the charterer’s obligation to operate and employ the vessel in a manner consistent with the CII Regulations is an absolute obligation. But the owner’s obligation to operate the vessel in a manner which minimises fuel consumption is one of due diligence only.

This imbalance has raised eyebrows with a few charterers, with some trying to limit their own obligations to the lower standard of diligence.

But how would an obligation to exercise due diligence be measured in the context of the clause? If there is a range of steps open to a charterer to comply, a due diligence obligation should allow it to consider these, choose what it reasonably thinks is best, and avoid liability if it does not work. However, if the only way to achieve compliance is, say, to slow steam, a due diligence obligation would not allow the charterer to avoid that course, even if it came with the risk of liability to third parties under sub-charters, bills of lading or sale contracts.

Changing the absolute obligation to exercising “reasonable commercial endeavours” could be more attractive to a charterer. Whether an owner would agree is another matter.

Incentivising charterers to agree to the clause or assume responsibility for CII compliance

Reports have emerged of charterers in strong negotiating positions resisting an un-amended BIMCO clause on the basis that it uses more stick than carrot to ensure compliance by (a) putting the responsibility to comply on the charterer and (b) giving the owner the right to reduce speed or demand alternate instructions. This is a significant departure from the usual division of rights and responsibilities in time charters and could result in the charterer incurring liabilities to third parties.

Faced with push-back, an owner may want to incentivise charterers to agree the clause or operate vessels in a manner which leads to a more favourable CII rating, for example by sharing in port authority incentives which are expected to be offered to vessels with a CII rating of A or B.

Alternatively, an owner could offer to take other steps not mentioned in the clause, but within its control, to improve a vessel’s energy efficiency. This could include more regular hull and propeller cleaning, upgrading a vessel’s hull coating or installing new energy efficient equipment. A charterer could similarly require an owner to take these steps in return for agreeing to a CII clause under which they take on responsibility for compliance.

In practice, it may not be possible for an owner to avoid taking proactive (and expensive) steps to improve a vessel’s rating if it is so inefficient that it would be not be possible for any charterer to operate it commercially, whilst also ensuring compliance with CII.

Back-to-back charters

Disponent owners often aim to charter out on back-to-back terms with their head charter. However, given that CII clauses are likely to be heavily negotiated with the final wording specific to each charter, we expect to see different clauses in the same chain of charters. Disponent owners should therefore pay particular attention to any exposure gaps and seek to limit them if a fully back-to-back position is not possible.

Nor is the BIMCO clause intended for use in voyage charters. While a BIMCO voyage charter CII clause is anticipated, for the time being parties to a voyage charter will need to agree provisions reflecting the position under any time charter as far as possible. For example, if a party time charters in and voyage charters out and the time charter includes the BIMCO clause, it should aim to agree a right in the voyage charter to sail by an indirect route or slow steam. Alternatively, it could look to include specific terms, e.g. in relation to routing and speed, to ensure the performance of a voyage charter does not put the disponent owner in breach of its time charter up the line.

Claims for breach of CII clauses

The repercussion for non-compliance with CII is that a vessel rated ‘D’ for three consecutive years, or ‘E’ for a single year, must provide a corrective action plan to be signed-off by the vessel’s flag state or class, failing which a vessel could be banned from trading.

Any losses of this type could in principle be recovered under the BIMCO clause. But if an owner suffers other losses in relation to CII, there may be questions about whether those losses were caused by the breach and recoverable in law. For example, what if an owner does not benefit from a future incentive for compliance provided by a port state or suffers an (as yet unknown) penalty imposed by port state or other authority for non-compliance? And what if an owner’s ability to fix the vessel for future voyages, or its market rate of hire, following redelivery is adversely affected? There is fertile ground here for disputes about the cause and recoverability of such losses.

Short term vs long term charters

The BIMCO clause seems best suited for longer term time charters. In short term or trip time charters, where the employment of the vessel is known, specific terms setting out routing, speed and other operational factors affecting energy efficiency may be more appropriate than adopting the BIMCO clause.

Concluding thoughts

The release of the BIMCO clause has had an immediate impact on the industry as owners and charterers grapple with what it means for their operations and wider business models. An owner can now say there is an “industry standard” position, but whether the clause and the delicate balancing act attempted by BIMCO will be widely accepted and actually become “industry standard” remains to be seen. And that’s before the anticipated “update” to the CII Regulations in 2026, intended to reflect the industry’s experience of the Regulations in the first three years, is even on the horizon.

But the initial reaction indicates the clause may be used as a starting point, even if it is amended. And in many cases the final wording will depend on bargaining positions.

The higher level clauses that appeared before the BIMCO clause – which often provided for parties to work together in good faith to ensure compliance or negotiate changes to charter clauses – may now be a thing of a past. It may well also be more difficult for charterers to argue that their largely unfettered right to employ the vessel should not be impeded or that they should not be the ones taking steps to reduce a vessel’s carbon intensity.

It is abundantly clear that the CII Regulations will have a direct impact on the day-to-day operation of vessels across the global fleet. Parties will need to be flexible to achieve compliance even before any update in 2026. The BIMCO clause provides a framework where none existed before, and we expect the market’s approach to CII compliance will mature and evolve as owners and charterers alike come to terms with the reality of the CII Regulations.

 

Photo credit: CHUTTERSNAP from Unsplash
Published: 21 December, 2022

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Interview

Interview: Alkagesta navigates risk from bunkering ops during turbulent times

As the industry navigates this period of uncertainty, the key question is no longer ‘what will fuel cost?’ but rather ‘will fuel be available?’, highlights Mithat Çiftçioğlu.

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Mithat MT

Mithat Çiftçioğlu, Marine Fuels Director at Alkagesta, shared his opinion on risk management for bunkering operations under current geopolitical tensions through the April edition of shipping magazine Deniz Ticaret.

The maritime publication, part of the Turkish Chamber of Shipping (İMEAK Deniz Ticaret Odası), has given Manifold Times permission to republish the article:

Fueling Ships in Turbulent Times

From Oil Shock to Fuel Access Crisis: A New Risk Map for Maritime 2026

The final weeks of the first quarter of 2026 mark one of the most complex periods in recent years for global energy and maritime markets. The sharp rise in oil and refined product prices since February 28 may look like a classic energy shock at first glance, but developments in the maritime sector point to a far deeper structural rupture.

What is being debated in the market today is no longer just oil prices. For traders and shipowners operating in the maritime sector and bunker market, the real issue is not the price of fuel — it is access to fuel. The fundamental question in the market has shifted: not what will the price of fuel be, but will fuel even be available?

In light of the Force Majeure cancellations at Asian ports over the past two weeks, another question must also be considered: Will pre-agreed bunker supply contracts actually be delivered?

From Oil Prices to Logistical Reality

Tensions in the Middle East have created a strong geopolitical risk premium in the oil market. Brent crude briefly surpassed the $100 per barrel mark, triggering a search for a new equilibrium across markets. This will inevitably bring inflation and recession back onto the global agenda in the months ahead.

But the rise in oil prices does not only reflect the risk of supply disruption — it also signals the return of one of the most fragile chokepoints in global energy trade:

The Strait of Hormuz

Approximately one-third of the world’s oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Around 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products transit Hormuz daily. Any disruption here would therefore affect not only oil prices, but also global refined product flows and the bunker market directly.

Why Strategic Oil Reserves Are Not the Solution

A commonly proposed solution in energy crises is the release of strategic petroleum reserves. However, releasing these reserves does not directly resolve a bunker crisis. Strategic reserves consist of crude oil. To produce bunker fuel, the following chain must be completed:

Crude oil → Refinery → Product logistics → Bunker port

This process takes time. Strategic reserves can temporarily stabilize oil prices, but they cannot solve the access problem in the bunker market in the short term.

Furthermore, the announced reserve release of 400 million barrels, to be drawn down at a rate of 2.5–3 million barrels per day, can only cover a small fraction of the estimated daily loss from the Middle East — optimistically 8–10 million barrels, pessimistically 18–20 million barrels per day.

A Historic Surge in Bunker Fuel Prices

The per-ton price of VLSFO (0.5% sulfur) bunker fuel has surpassed $1,000, reaching approximately double pre-war levels. This also represents some of the highest prices seen since July 2022.

While prices at bunker hubs such as Singapore and Fujairah are approaching $1,100 per ton, European markets have remained comparatively lower.

The Real Problem Is Not Price — It Is Fuel Access

Obtaining bunker quotes for April has become increasingly difficult, particularly at Asian ports. Even where shipowners and traders can secure quotes, the absence of supply guarantees makes pricing extremely challenging.

A senior executive at Oldendorff Carriers summarized the situation in these words:

“We cannot price cargo because we cannot calculate fuel costs; we cannot calculate fuel costs because there is no supply guarantee.”

The CEO of Maersk has compared the current situation to the pandemic era, stating that companies are attempting to source fuel through methods they have never tried before in order to keep global shipping networks supplied.

While supply is tight and prices are near their peak in Singapore and Fujairah, Rotterdam appears relatively more balanced. However, as the conflict drags on, risk perception in European markets is also rising.

The surge in bunker prices will not only increase costs — it will also affect global maritime transport capacity. Ships are expected to reduce their speeds to conserve fuel. This could lead to a reduction in effective carrying capacity, creating new logistical bottlenecks in global trade.

The importance of working with reliable, long-term partners has never been more apparent than during a crisis such as this.

The Widening Price Spread Between Fuel Types

A notable development in the bunker market in recent weeks is the rapid widening of price differentials between different fuel types. Two spreads in particular have expanded significantly:

  • Marine Gas Oil (MGO) – VLSFO
  • VLSFO – HSFO

Rising demand for distillate products, refinery production balances, and regional supply tightness are all contributing to this widening. As a result, bunker purchases have become not merely a matter of price level, but a strategic decision tied to product type and port selection.

An Unexpected Development: Biofuels Becoming Competitive

Another noteworthy development in the bunker market is that biofuels have remained at relatively competitive price levels. This creates two important opportunities for shipowners.

On one hand, biofuels remain competitively priced in certain markets. On the other, they offer a means of compliance with new regulations entering into force in Europe — particularly the FuelEU Maritime and EU ETS frameworks, which require reductions in carbon intensity. In this context, biofuels have become a strategic option for many shipowners.

Conclusion: Active Bunker Management Is The New Normal

The 2026 bunker market presents one of the most complex energy trading environments in recent years. The rise in oil prices, geopolitical risk at the Strait of Hormuz, tightness in physical fuel supply, and widening price spreads between fuel types have made bunker fuel management more critical than ever.

The prevailing view in energy markets is that as long as the risk at the Strait of Hormuz persists, turbulence in the bunker market will persist with it. As time passes, the depletion of commercial stocks may deepen the existing supply tightness further.

For this reason, the current situation is viewed not merely as an energy crisis, but as a new stress scenario testing the logistical infrastructure of global trade.

The view increasingly heard across energy markets is this:

“As long as Hormuz remains closed, it will not be oil prices but fuel access that constitutes the defining risk for global shipping.”

Finally, for shipowners and operators, bunker strategies are shifting away from a passive purchasing approach toward a model grounded in active risk management.

 

Photo and article credit: Deniz Ticaret
Published: 7 May 2026

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Analysis

T&E: Overreliance on traditional bunker fuels costs shipping USD 395 million a day due to Iran conflict

Development has made alternative fuels increasingly more competitive, states Eloi Nordé, shipping policy officer at T&E.

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The Hormuz crisis adds over 300 million a day to shippings fossil fuels bills

The European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E) on 27 March highlighted the adoption of green marine fuels would reduce the shipping industry’s exposure to fuel price shocks in future.

It noted shipping companies are spending an extra €340 million (USD 394.74 million) a day in additional fuel costs as a result of the latest conflict in the Gulf.

As 99% of the global fleet runs on fossil fuels, the industry is directly exposed to fuel price volatility and supply disruptions. Efficiency measures, electrification and e-fuels would reduce the industry’s exposure to price fluctuations.

According to T&E, marine fuel prices have escalated rapidly, with VLSFO reaching €941 per tonne in Singapore, up 223% since the start of 2026. At the same time, LNG prices have risen by 72% since early March. Since February 28, shipping companies have incurred more than €4.6 billion in additional fuel costs.

The development has made alternative fuels increasingly more competitive. As fossil fuel prices reach record highs again, the cost gap with e-fuels is narrowing.

T&E’s research shows that the cost gap between marine gas oil – one of the more expensive fossil fuels – and e-fuels has shrunk to near parity (+5%) in some ports.

Hormuz oil crisis boosts potential e fuel competitiveness

While the trend may be temporary, it shows that the volatility of fossil fuel markets offsets much of the structural cost disadvantage of clean fuels.

“Chaos in the Strait of Hormuz is putting global maritime trade under the spotlight. But it’s on the oil markets where its impact will be felt the most. The war is costing the industry millions every day,” said Eloi Nordé, shipping policy officer at T&E.

“Some governments and parts of the industry have spent the last year bashing green maritime measures as being too expensive, yet those costs pale in comparison to this super-disruption.

“If anything, this crisis should be the catalyst for more investment in European e-fuels and greater uptake of energy efficiency measures to avoid fossil fuel shocks in the future.”

 

Photo credit: European Federation for Transport and Environment
Published: 2 April 2026

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Business

Interview: Nunchi Marine believes Iran war forces a reset in bunker cargo trading

Tomas Stacy, Managing Director of Bunker Trading at oil cargo and bunker trading company, Nunchi Marine, comments on volatility, supply disruption and survival in a fractured market.

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The war involving Iran has pushed the global bunker market into one of its most turbulent periods in recent memory, with Singapore – the world’s largest bunkering hub – feeling the impact.

Once‑reliable supply chains have been disrupted, price volatility has surged to extreme levels, and bunker cargo traders are being forced to abandon long‑standing strategies in favour of defensive, risk‑driven decision‑making.

The sharp reduction in Middle Eastern supply flows has exposed structural vulnerabilities in the market, while suppliers and traders alike have tightened terms amid unprecedented uncertainty.

Against this backdrop, bunker cargo trading has shifted from margin optimisation to survival mode. In this executive interview, Tomas Stacy, Managing Director of Bunker Trading at Singapore-headquartered independent oil cargo and bunker trading company, Nunchi Marine shares how the conflict is reshaping bunker cargo trading, the challenges importers now face, and what it takes to navigate a market defined by scarcity, volatility and risk.

MT: How has the Iran war changed the bunker cargo trading landscape in Singapore?

TS: The change has been structural rather than cyclical. The market is now characterised by extreme price volatility, tighter availability, and far more defensive behaviour from both traders and physical suppliers. The conflict has disrupted a core supply artery into Asia, and that has exposed just how dependent Singapore has been on stable Middle Eastern flows. Trading today is less about optimising margins and more about managing risk and ensuring continuity of supply.

MT: What has been the most immediate impact on bunker cargo importers since the conflict began?

TS: Margin pressure and uncertainty have intensified almost overnight. The sharp drop in tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz has effectively choked a primary supply source, and that has translated directly into price shocks. Since the war began, VLSFO prices in Singapore have more than doubled, while MGO prices have surged even more sharply. For importers, this has made forward planning extremely difficult and increased exposure on every cargo decision.

MT: Why has the market struggled to replace lost Middle Eastern barrels?

TS: The scale of the disruption is the key issue. The Middle East typically supplies around 1.2 million metric tons of fuel oil per month to Asia, and there is no simple replacement for that volume. Alternative supplies from the Americas or Russia exist, but they are constrained by high freight costs, sanctions, or limited availability. In practical terms, arbitrage opportunities into Singapore have become largely unworkable, leaving the market structurally tight.

MT: How has extreme price volatility changed trading behaviour and supplier relationships?

TS: Volatility has fundamentally altered risk appetite. At the onset of the conflict, prices were moving by as much as $100 to $150 per metric ton in a single day, which makes holding large cargo positions highly risky. In response, physical suppliers have become increasingly defensive—rationing volumes, prioritising long‑standing customers, and avoiding even short‑term term contracts. For traders, this has meant smaller position sizes, shorter, and a much greater emphasis on counterparty strength and reliability.

MT: Beyond price and supply, what risks are now top of mind for bunker cargo traders?

TS: Quality and logistics have moved sharply up the risk agenda. Recent alerts around off‑spec VLSFO in Singapore which were linked to engine damage, have added a new layer of concern for cargo procurement. At the same time, tight supply conditions are beginning to create logistical bottlenecks, with some vessels struggling to secure bunker slots and early signs of congestion appearing at major ports. In this environment, survival depends on disciplined risk management—avoiding long‑term fixed‑price exposure, strengthening supplier relationships, enforcing stricter quality controls, and building greater operational flexibility into voyage planning.

 

Photo credit: Manifold Times
Published: 31 March 2026

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