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PricewaterhouseCoopers resigns as auditors of Brightoil Petroleum

PwC was not able to obtain further information nor satisfactory explanations of the trading activity between certain parties, amongst other issues.

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Professional services firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) have tendered their resignation as the auditor of Hong Kong-listed Brightoil Petroleum Holdings effective Thursday (23 January), said the oil company in a statement.

The Chairman of the Board at Brightoil Petroleum on 8 January 2020 sent PwC a letter to terminate PwC as auditor due to concerns of it not being able to complete the company’s 2017 Financial Statements by 31 January 2020 and potential additional fee for the financial statements.

PwC, in short, explained it was not able to obtain further information nor satisfactory explanations of the trading activity between Brightoil Petroleum (S’pore) Pte. Ltd. and Shenzhen Brightoil Group Co., Ltd., amongst other issues.

An extract of the resignation letter of PwC dated 23 January 2020 which sets out its reasons for resignation and the unresolved matters in the respect of the audit of the 2017 Financial Statements has been reproduced below:

“We were engaged to conduct audit of the consolidated financial statements of the Company as of and for the year ended 30 June 2017 (the “2017 Financial Statements”). During the course of our audit, we noted that Brightoil Petroleum (S’pore) Pte. Ltd. (“BOPS”), an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company, conducted back-to-back trading of oil product transactions with twelve customers (the “Customers”) (the “Transactions”). Seven of these Customers represented new customers to BOPS. Management did not indicate to us that the Customers might themselves be related, however, we became aware that nine of these Customers are owned by certain individual and certain of these Customers have the same registered and/or correspondence addresses. The corresponding purchases for the sales to these Customers were from Shenzhen Brightoil Group Co., Ltd. (“SZBO”, a company which is beneficially owned and controlled by Dr Sit Kwong Lam, the ultimate controlling shareholder of the Company), three of the Customers and an alleged third party supplier. We also became aware that there were multiple sales transactions of cargos of oil to certain of the Customers which were carried by the same vessel and of same or similar quantities within the same day. Management represented that the nature and terms of these transactions were similar to those commodity trading transactions executed in the market place, however, it came to our attention that substantially all of the corresponding purchases for these multiple sale transactions were made from SZBO. We were advised by management that certain of the receivables arising from the Transactions were netted off with the trade payables to SZBO pursuant to certain tri-parties agreements, while a portion of which were settled by the abovementioned three Customers who are also suppliers of BOPS. As at 30 June 2017, certain outstanding trade receivables from these Customers were overdue but the due dates were extended by BOPS. Management advised us that there were no further cash settlement of the outstanding receivables balance by the Customers from 30 June 2017 to 15 September 2017.

In connection with the above, as communicated to the Board and the Audit Committee of the Company through our letter dated 15 September 2017 and subsequent follow up letters dated 28 February 2018, 10 May 2018, and 10 December 2018, we have requested to interview the Customers and to obtain full explanation and the necessary information and documentation to substantiate the Transactions, including but not limited to

    1.  the background of the Customers and the relationships among themselves, especially for those with same registered and/or correspondence addresses, and the relationship of the Customers with SZBO and with the Group, if any;
    2. background checks and credit assessments on the Customers together with the detailed information reviewed by the Group at the time of accepting these Customers and upon the extension of the repayment dates of certain of the receivables from these Customers;
    3. the occurrence and underlying commercial substance and business reasons of the multiple sales and purchases transactions of cargos of oil carried by the same vessel and of same or similar quantities in one day between the Customers and SZBO;
    4. the underlying commercial substance and business reasons of the netting off arrangement together with the underlying information;
    5.  supporting documents in respect of the settlement transactions between SZBO and the Customers;
    6. the commercial substance and underlying business reasons of purchases from certain of the Customers;
    7. the underlying purchase and goods receiving supporting information and documents of SZBO to substantiate its sources of oil supply; and
    8. management’s assessment of the collectability of the outstanding receivables as at 30 June 2017, together with the related evidences and the underlying business reasons of extending the repayment dates of certain of the overdue receivables.

Because of the unusual nature and the significance of the matters noted, we requested the Board to form an independent investigation committee to commission an independent investigation (the “Investigation”) to be conducted by an independent professional advisor in response to those matters. The Audit Committee, as authorised by the Board, engaged an independent advisor (“Independent Advisor”) in September 2017 to provide forensic technology and investigation services (the “Independent Advisor’s Investigation”) in respect of BOPS as well as other entities within the Group, where appropriate, and the Transactions.

We were provided with the Draft Progress Update Report prepared by the Independent Advisor in December 2018. The report summarised the findings of the procedures carried out by the Independent Advisor up to 3 November 2017. We understand that the Independent Advisor did not receive all the information and explanations which they had requested. They also proposed to carry out further investigation procedures, including but not limited to computer forensic procedures.

However, the Independent Advisor’s Investigation was not resumed as the Company considered that the estimated costs and expenses involved were unexpectedly high.

On 28 June 2019, the Company appointed three new independent non-executive directors (the “new INEDs”) to the Board and its Audit Committee to fill the vacancy arose from the resignation of the then Independent Non-executive Directors, and the Board had resolved to form an Independent Control Committee (the “ICC”) comprising the new INEDs as members to oversee the Investigation.

Subsequently, we were advised by the ICC that another independent professional advisor was engaged on 27 August 2019 to perform the Investigation as an Independent Forensic Accountant to replace the Independent Advisor.

As communicated in a number of occasions to the Board, the Audit Committee and the ICC, we, as auditor of the Company, need to be satisfied with respect to the adequacy of the scope and procedures of the Investigation. During the period from September to November 2019, various conference calls were held amongst the members of the ICC, the Independent Forensic Accountant and ourselves to verbally discuss the scope and status of the Investigation. We have requested the Independent Forensic Accountant to provide us with access to their working papers during these meetings but it is yet to be arranged up to the date of this letter.

On 2 January 2020, we were provided with the Draft Forensic Investigation Report (“Draft Investigation Report’) prepared by the Independent Forensic Accountant…….”

PwC, based on the Draft Investigation Report, noted certain key findings made by the Independent Forensic Accountant and made the following comments in the Resignation Letter:

“……Those key findings from the Draft Investigation Report are new to us, and might have significant bearings on the matters that we raised in our letters dated 15 September 2017, 28 February 2018, 10 May 2018 and 10 December 2018. Upon receipt of the Draft Investigation Report, we immediately started our internal review process and were in the process of assembling our comments and follow up questions on the Draft Investigation Report. Before we were able to do so, however, we received a letter from the Chairman of the Board on 8 January 2020 stating the intention of the Board to terminate our appointment as auditor of the Company for the 2017 Financial Statements due to the concerns as to whether we will be able to complete the audit of the 2017 Financial Statements by 31 January 2020 and as well, the potential additional fee for the completion of the audit of the 2017 Financial Statements.

As we have not been able to obtain further information nor satisfactory explanations and evidence in connection with the matters described in our aforementioned letter dated 15 September 2017, 28 February 2018, 10 May 2018 and 10 December 2018, and given the messages stated in the abovementioned letter from the Chairman of the Board, we believe we will not be able to perform the necessary audit procedures for the audit of the 2017 Financial Statements and therefore agree to terminate the audit relationship with the Company.”

Following the above development, Brightoil Petroleum stated HLB Hodgson Impey Cheng Limited as the new auditor of the company with effect from 23 January 2020; it will fill the casual vacancy following the resignation of PwC and hold office until the conclusion of Brightoil’s forthcoming annual general meeting.

 

Related: HKSE probes ‘management integrity’ of Brightoil Petroleum Holdings
Related: Brightoil faces $161 million claim from China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering
Related: Official: Dr Sit Kwong Lam leaves Brightoil Petroleum Holdings
Related: Petrolimex Singapore wins USD 30 million bankruptcy order against ex-Brightoil Chairman
Related: Hong Kong: Dr Sit Kwong Lam returns to Brightoil as Strategic Adviser

 

Photo credit: Brightoil
Published: 28 January, 2019

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Legal

Singapore police arrest eight over alleged illegal MGO transaction off Tuas

SPF says preliminary investigations found that crew members of a Singapore-registered tugboat misappropriated MGO worth about SGD 10,570 without their company’s knowledge and sold it illegally.

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Singapore police arrest eight over alleged illegal MGO transaction off Tuas

The Singapore Police Force (SPF) on Thursday (13 August) said it has arrested eight men, aged between 25 and 54, for their suspected involvement in an illegal transaction of Marine Gas Oil (MGO).

On 13 August 2026 at about 1.05am, officers from the Police Coast Guard (PCG) conducted a check on a Singapore-registered tugboat in the waters off Tuas and discovered that eight crew members were possibly involved in the illegal transaction of MGO. 

“Preliminary investigations revealed that the crew members of the tugboats misappropriated MGO valued at about SGD 10,570 (USD 8,258), without their company’s knowledge,” SPF said in a statement.

“The MGO was sold illegally for their personal financial gain.”

The eight crew members will be charged in court on 14 August 2026 with the offence of theft by servant of property in possession of master under Section 381 of the Penal Code 1871 If convicted, they shall be punished with an imprisonment term that may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

“The Police take a serious view of illegal transaction of MGO in Singapore Territorial Waters and will continue to conduct enforcement and security checks to prevent, deter and detect such illicit activities in Singapore waters,” SPF added. 

 

Photo credit: Singapore Police Force
Published: 14 August, 2026

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Port & Regulatory

Gard: Sulphur-related bunker claims rise amid tighter China MSA enforcement

Claims involving excessive sulphur content in marine fuels have been rising, while stricter inspections by the China MSA have heightened the focus on sulphur compliance, particularly in the Bohai Sea.

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shraga kopstein on Unsplash

Maritime protection and indemnity (P&I) club Gard on Wednesday (12 August) highlighted that claims involving excessive sulphur content in marine fuels have been rising, while stricter inspections by the China MSA have heightened the focus on sulphur compliance, particularly in the Bohai Sea:

Rise in off-spec sulphur claims

Recent claims experience indicates that bunker quality continues to pose a significant operational risk for shipowners. In our earlier review of bunker-related claims during the first five months of 2026, we highlighted a rise in off-specification bunker incidents amid increased pressure on global fuel supply chains following the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East. 

Specifically for Sulphur compliance, between January and June 2026, the number of sulphur-related cases increased by more than threefold compared with the same period in 2025. Notably, the number of cases recorded in the first six months of this year has already exceeded the total number reported during the whole of last year by approximately 40%. 

While each case is fact-specific, the increase is notable because excessive sulphur content constitutes a MARPOL compliance issue. Unlike many other bunker quality problems, sulphur non-compliance identified through port state inspections can result in vessel delays, enforcement action, and substantial costs associated with debunkering and fuel disposal. 

The map below illustrates the geographical distribution of sulphur-related claims recorded during the first six months of 2026, based on the location where the bunkers were stemmed.

Distribution of sulphur related claims

China MSA steps up sulphur compliance enforcement

According to our correspondent, Huatai, on 5 June 2026, the maritime authorities of Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning and Shandong jointly launched a special campaign on ship pollution prevention and control in the Bohai Sea region. The campaign involves coordinated supervision by local MSA branches across the region and is expected to last nearly five months. It covers major ports and surrounding port areas in the Bohai Sea region, including Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Huanghua, Jinzhou, Yingkou and Longkou. 

While the initiative is broader than bunker sulphur compliance alone, its scope includes inspections relating to air pollution prevention, SOx emissions, fuel compliance and other high-pollution-risk operations. Enforcement measures are expected to comprise onboard inspections, cross-regional enforcement activities, unannounced spot checks and remote monitoring. These efforts will be supported by a combination of UAV patrols, maritime patrol vessels, shore-based monitoring systems and rapid on-site fuel testing. 

As a result, vessels trading in the Bohai Sea region may experience increased scrutiny of fuel compliance documentation, fuel sampling records, onboard fuel management procedures, and the handling or disposal of suspected non-compliant fuel.

Documents typically requested by China MSA

Based on our recent experience, including the case discussed above, and subject to the specific requirements of the local MSA office, owners and operators may be requested to provide supporting documentation such as: 

  • Bunker documentation – Bunker Delivery Notes (BDNs), MARPOL fuel sample records, fuel test reports, and relevant fuel quality certificates. 
  • Statutory certificates – including the International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate and International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate. 
  • Operational records – engine logbooks, deck and navigation logbooks, Oil Record Book entries, and records relating to fuel transfers, storage and consumption. 
  • Sampling documentation – the Master’s statement and any records demonstrating how fuel samples were drawn, sealed, labelled, handled and retained. 
  • Correspondence records – communications with the authorities, bunker suppliers, charterers and other relevant stakeholders. 
  • Fuel disposal records – approved disposal plans, debunkering documentation, receipts and evidence of final disposal, where applicable. 

The exact documentation required will depend on the nature of the investigation, the findings of the inspection, and the requirements of the local enforcement authority. 

Possible regulatory consequences in China

Under the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, ocean-going vessels are required to use fuel oil meeting atmospheric pollutant control requirements after berthing. Vessels operating within designated emission control areas must also comply with applicable emission standards. Article 106 provides that where vessel fuel oil fails to meet applicable standards or requirements, the competent maritime authorities may impose fines ranging from RMB 10,000 to RMB 100,000. Liability may extend to shipowners, ship operators and ship managers depending upon the circumstances of the case. 

Recommendation

Sulphur compliance should be treated as both a fuel quality and regulatory risk. Owners and operators are encouraged to take preventive steps before bunkering, act promptly if non-compliant fuel is suspected, and preserve evidence carefully if an inspection or claim arises. Under amended 

Resolution A.1206(34), Appendix 18, 2.1.5, if the BDN shows compliant fuel, but the master has independent test results of the fuel oil sample taken by the ship during the bunkering which indicates non-compliance, the master may document this by notifying the ship’s flag Administration, with copies to: 

  • the competent authority of the relevant port of destination, 
  • the Administration under whose jurisdiction the bunker deliverer is located, 
  • and to the bunker deliverer.

 

Photo credit: shraga kopstein on Unsplash / Gard
Published: 14 August, 2026

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LNG Bunkering

Shell expands LNG bunkering footprint in Spain with Valencia

As one of the region’s key maritime hubs, the company said Valencia expands the options available to shipowners seeking LNG supply along major shipping routes.

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Shell expands LNG bunkering footprint in Spain with Valencia

British oil giant Shell on Thursday (13 August) said Valencia has joined its growing network of bunkering locations, making LNG available as a marine fuel.

The successful completion of the first LNG bunkering operation in Valencia marked an important milestone for Spain and further strengthened Shell’s LNG supply capabilities across the Mediterranean. 

In a video shared by the company, bunkering vessel Alice Consulich was shown supplying an undisclosed volume of LNG to the container ship MSC Sabrina.

“As one of the region’s key maritime hubs, Valencia expands the options available to shipowners seeking LNG supply along major shipping routes,” Shell said in a social media post. 

Shell said the achievement reflected the strong collaboration across the maritime value chain, including MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, the Port of Valencia and Fratelli Cosulich Group.

“We look forward to making more LNG bunker deliveries in Valencia and across the Mediterranean as LNG infrastructure and capabilities continue to expand,” the company said. 

 

Photo credit: Shell
Published: 14 August, 2026

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