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Campbell Johnston Clark: Legal and Contractual Considerations for EEXI and CII

The shipping industry will adapt to the important new regulations aimed at lowering carbon emissions as it always does and it is hoped that vessels can be run efficiently going forward.

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International law shipping firm Campbell Johnston Clark in early November published an article discussing the issues on Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) and Carbon Intensity Index (CII); Singapore bunkering publication Manifold Times has received permission from the firm to publish the article in its entirety:

Although January 2023 may appear to be some time away, shipowners and operators are having to consider the likely consequences of the Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index and the Carbon Intensity Index now.

CJC London Director Ian Short and London Trainee Solicitor Evgenia Kanellopoulou explore some of the legal and contractual issues arising from changes to MARPOL.

Background 

Ships and vessels have been used for the transportation of cargo for centuries, starting with self-propelled craft through to sailing ships where vessels would harness the power of the wind to propel the vessel. Such forms of transport had, of course, a low carbon footprint. Steam-powered ships took the place of the sailing vessels, before in turn giving way to the commercial fleets that we see today, with ships powered by fuel oil, diesel oil and, sometimes, LNG. As the important issues of climate change and ensuring a low carbon footprint rightly come ever more to the fore, the shipping industry is looking to go full circle at least in terms of limiting carbon emissions, whilst looking for innovative ways to maintain efficiency. 

Whilst it is easy to talk about climate change and ways to decarbonise shipping, in truth, the shipping business is a commercial world and directors owe duties to shareholders to maximise profits. Where owners and operators may have good intentions to become cleaner and greener, a “sea-change” in attitudes is only likely when a failure to adhere to standards would lead to an adverse commercial impact. 

Regulations restricting the use of high sulphur content in marine fuels to those vessels equipped with exhaust gas scrubbers were introduced in January 2020. Whilst the fuel switch brought some inevitable commercial disputes, ultimately the change to lower sulphur fuels was one that the maritime industry adapted to well.

The Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) 

With greenhouse gases rather than sulphur in mind, the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) is the latest tool to decarbonise shipping. Based on design parameters, the IMO proposes that a minimum efficiency standard for existing ships should be established and that only those designed for efficient, low carbon-emitting vessels should be allowed to continue trading. The EEXI is a variant of the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), which applies to new ships built after 2013. The EEXI is determined by CO2 emissions per tonne mile and the main factors in its calculation are the vessel’s installed power and cargo-carrying capacity. The EEXI is a one-off ‘pass or fail’ paper test which will be done at the first annual or special survey and will affect more than half of the world fleet when it enters into force in January 2023. 

The main method of compliance for ships that do not meet the required EEXI will be to adopt engine power limitation. This is a relatively simple and cost-effective solution and should cause minimal disruption to the vessel’s operation. Another option is to adopt technologies which have been calibrated for their effect on energy efficiency. These technologies have been rated A to C and include those that will immediately reduce a vessel’s power requirement, such as antifouling coatings; those that passively capture energy, such as solar panels; and equipment that improves efficiency but requires power, including Flettner rotors or air lubrication.

The Carbon Intensity Index (CII) 

Where the EEXI is a one-time certification targeting design parameters, the Carbon Intensity Index (CII) is an annual review of a ship’s actual carbon emission performance over the past year with such monitoring starting from January 2023. It addresses emissions in operation and has been devised to measure how efficiently a ship transports goods or passengers, in grams of CO2 emitted per cargo carrying capacity and nautical mile terms.

Ships will be rated between A and E based on their emissions performance. Ships rated D and E will be forced to take corrective actions which may involve significant cost to the shipowner. Rating thresholds will also become increasingly stringent towards 2030. 

CII compliance will involve considerable planning in coming up with technical and operational solutions to improve the emissions performance of vessels. There are unlikely to be significant impacts for noncompliance and/or low ratings until 2026 but it will be interesting to see longer term whether, in addition to remedial action, the market will generate its own practical penalties, for example D or E rated ships not being considered favourably by charterers when fixing the vessels or, indeed, attracting lower rates. 

Impact 

The above proposed changes will affect all ships built before 2010 which consume large volumes of fuel compared to modern designs. They will also affect 60-70% of bulk carriers, mainly above Panamax, and a significant percentage of tankers, mainly larger than Aframax, as well as LNG carriers and 250 steam turbine ships worldwide. The various ways owners could reduce CO2 emissions include slow-steaming, weather routing, optimised port rotation, reduction of cargo intake and use of alternative fuels, such as biofuels and LNG.

Legal and Contractual Considerations

With the date of the EEXI and CII implementation approaching, owners and operators ought to have in mind the possible legal challenges that might arise. Any initial modifications to meet EEXI requirements are likely to fall on the shipowner as the owner is obliged to comply with MARPOL and will likely have contractual obligations to ensure compliance with the convention and its regulations under charterparties too.

With regards to time charters that run after 2023 and beyond, owners and charterers will have to consider their options carefully. For example, shipowners may need to ensure that they have included in their draft contracts clauses that will allow them to address all technical matters arising as a result of the new IMO decarbonisation obligations imposed by EEXI and CII. Owners may want to ensure that they have the liberty to effect works on the vessel to be retrofitted to incorporate new technologies so that the vessel complies with the new regulations before they come into effect beginning of 2023 or enable them to take remedial actions post-January 2023. For example, owners may want the ability to arrange dry-docking the vessel during the charter for modifications, or an additional dry-dock, thus taking the vessel temporarily out of charterers’ service but without being in breach of the charter.

Owners will also need to ensure that they can both comply with the EEXI regulations and ensure a sufficient CII rating thereafter whilst at the same time complying with their obligations to contractual counterparts, such as charterers and bill of lading holders. Otherwise, the owners may end up with a conflicting set of obligations. The clearest example of this might be a reduced speed as a result of the new regulations, such as by virtue of engine power limitation, versus inconsistent speed and performance warranties in the charter party. It is not unforeseeable that a situation may arise whereby the vessel has to proceed at a certain speed in order to comply with the new MARPOL regulations yet nevertheless faces potential underperformance claims from charterers, with the owners therefore facing potential deductions from hire. 

On a similar note, shipowners ordinarily have obligations for the vessel to proceed with all due dispatch or utmost dispatch, whether under a time charter, voyage charter or to bill of lading holders. It will not always follow that the most efficient operation for decarbonisation is the same as the fastest route to the loading or discharging port. Owners will therefore need to ensure that, going forward, they are not found in breach of contractual utmost dispatch obligations when merely attempting to comply with the new MARPOL requirements. Since the commercial shipping world has evolved over the years with multiple contracts in play at any one time, this is not necessarily as straightforward as incorporating a single clause dealing with performance and speed issues in the charter party unless the terms of that charter party are also incorporated into bills of lading – otherwise a shipowner may be permitted under a charter party to operate at reduced speeds whether by virtue of engine power limitation or otherwise to ensure EEXI compliance and achieve a desired CII efficiency rating yet still face claims under, say, the bill of lading from cargo interests for failing to carry the cargo with all due dispatch. From the owners’ point of view, the charter party clauses ought to therefore go further such that charterers warrant the inclusion of similar provisions in the bill of lading terms or otherwise be held accountable to indemnify the owners for any losses arising out of alleged utmost dispatch breaches to cargo interests.

From a charterers’ perspective, they will want to try to ensure that they are giving lawful and legitimate orders to the vessel when ordering the vessel to proceed at certain speeds. Otherwise, a charterer under a long-term charter runs the risk of having to pay the agreed rate of hire for a vessel which, post-January 2023, may become less commercially efficient in terms of its earnings (for example, freight is earned less frequently under sub-charters) whilst the owner concentrates on the vessel’s carbon efficiency. 

There are also further knock-on effects of slower speeds and engine power limitation under voyage charters. For example, a charterer in its role as disponent owner may want to start the laytime/demurrage clock ticking as soon as possible by steaming as fast as possible into the port and then earn demurrage whilst the vessel waits at anchorage as opposed to the vessel slow steaming into the port just in time for berthing thus depriving the charterer/disponent owner of potential further charter income but which would produce CO2 savings. A rethink of the traditional demurrage model under voyage charters may be necessary to truly encourage all contractual parties in the chain of shipping contracts to have decarbonisation in mind. 

Reducing cargo intake is another possible way that owners could seek to reduce their vessel’s CO2 emissions. Therefore, it could be the case that some owners may decide to reduce cargo intake in order to consume less fuel and, therefore, reduce the risk of a poorer CII rating. However, again, this option could put owners at risk of being found in breach of their obligations under the charterparty; for example, if owners are in breach of any cargo capacity warranty or if owners do not allow charterers the whole reach of the vessel’s holds and cargo spaces. Owners may also want to ensure that final cargo quantity ranges are contractually at owners’, as opposed to charterers’, option but that may not always be commercially viable in circumstances where the vessel has been chartered in to load a specific cargo and a specific quantity of that cargo. Whilst it is considered unlikely, care will have to be taken to ensure that engine power limitation and possible cargo limitation does not have the net effect of requiring the use of more vessels to perform shipments to ensure greater carbon efficiency on a vessel-by-vessel basis in circumstances where the overall carbon output of using more vessels could be greater than the use of less, albeit less carbon efficient, shipments.

Conclusion

The shipping industry will adapt to the important new regulations aimed at lowering carbon emissions as it always does and it is hoped that vessels can be run efficiently from both an environmental and commercial perspective going forward. 

However, as ever with the introduction of new regulations, owners and charterers will need to carefully consider the commercial, legal and contractual position between themselves in advance if they are to avoid potential disputes as the new regulations come into force.

 

Source: Campbell Johnston Clark
Photo credit: Kerensa Pickett from Unsplash
Published: 2 December, 2021

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Bunker Fuel

Alkagesta highlights key insights on European choke point pressures in August

Update covers dual supply crisis currently shaping global bunker markets — a stalled Strait of Hormuz peace process and Rhine water levels at a 140-year record low — and the implications for Singapore.

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Alkagesta

Malta-based global commodity trading house Alkagesta recently shared latest market insight examining the dual supply crisis gripping global energy markets as diplomatic efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz stall and Rhine water levels fall to record lows, creating what the company describes as a “state of emergency” for European inland fuel distribution.

In an article published on Alkagesta Market Insights on 11 August, the company’s trading and market intelligence teams outlined how the convergence of two simultaneous logistical crises is tightening prompt fuel availability across Singapore, Northwest Europe, and the Mediterranean:

Strait of Hormuz transits fell to a near-one-month low of 13 ships on August 9 following an attack on an ADNOC-linked tanker, as both the US and Iran demand war reparations before any reopening agreement can be reached. Simultaneously, Rhine water levels at the Kaub chokepoint fell to 16 cm on August 10 — the lowest since records began in 1880 — with forecasts pointing to a further drop to just 4 cm by August 14, effectively halting barge traffic and trapping fuel oil stocks at the ARA hub.

The supply picture across both key hubs has deteriorated sharply. In Singapore, Middle Eastern fuel oil imports nearly tripled week-over-week to 328,878 mt by July 29 — the highest volume since March — providing some relief as onshore commercial heavy distillate stocks rose to a five-week high of 19.58 million barrels by August 5. However, July bunker fuel sales are estimated to have fallen 3.7% month-over-month to 4.44 million mt, with elevated premiums redirecting prompt demand toward alternative ports including Zhoushan and Port Klang.

In Europe, the VLSFO market remains acutely undersupplied as refiners continue to prioritize high-margin diesel over low-sulfur blending components, while the Rhine crisis has forced barges to operate at just 15–20% of normal capacity — with freight rates from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe rising more than 400% in two months.

Alkagesta’s strategic outlook points to a potential total breakdown in Rhine-linked inland distribution by mid-August, a VLSFO Hi-5 spread likely to remain above $200/mt through Q3, and a global crude market that analysts warn requires an additional 2.1 million b/d for 18 months to rebuild depleted inventories.

Note: The full article can be read here.

 

Photo credit: Alkagesta
Published: 17 August, 2026

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Bunker Fuel

Integr8 Fuels: Why bunker markets could be lower than we thought

Marine fuel prices could prove lower than previously anticipated as easing refinery margins and improving bunker market fundamentals outweigh a still-uncertain crude oil outlook, says Integr8 Fuels.

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By Steve Christy, Expert Contributor, Integr8 Fuels

29 July 2026

We have just seen one false dawn, is there another to come? 

Last month, we wrote about how close we were to the expected lows in Brent and Rotterdam bunker prices, but not yet Singapore. Given what has happened since, a month is not only a long time in politics, but also a very long time in the bunker market. 

There was a resumption of attacks in the Arabian Gulf region on 13 July, followed by targeted Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea oil infrastructure and shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As a result, Brent futures fell to lows of around $70/bbl in late June and early July before surging to a high of $100/bbl on 23 July. Over the same period, Singapore VLSFO fell to $635/mt before climbing to $865/mt, a swing of $230/mt in just 16 days. 

Jul 2026 Graph 01 1024x613 1

Prices at the start of this week fell sharply after a halt in Arabian Gulf attacks over the weekend, with front month Brent was down to intra-day lows of $84/bbl, and Singapore VLSFO $750/mt.  However, at the time of writing there has been a ‘surprise’ attack by Iran, and retaliatory action by the US, with prices rising again.  It looks like we could be at another false dawn. 

The obvious questions are: will there be a return to peace negotiations, and are we close to the end of the war and free-flowing traffic through the strait of Hormuz (and also the Bab el-Mandeb)? The obvious answer is, we don’t know; there are only a few people that are likely to know the answer to this. All we can do is plan for every eventuality. 

Low stocks, higher bunker prices, and a strong Singapore VLSFO premium: it’s a challenge 

For those of us in the bunker market, the point we made last month about Singapore VLSFO trading at a strong premium to crude still holds, albeit slightly less pronounced. The loss of supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, together with the added uncertainty surrounding Saudi product exports from the Jizan and Rabigh refineries on the Red Sea, has sustained this premium. 

These developments are likely to keep the Singapore VLSFO premium to crude at elevated levels until there is greater confidence that Middle East crude and product supplies are returning to more normal trading patterns. Amid all the price volatility, this Singapore VLSFO premium remains a key indicator to watch. 

Backwardation in Brent futures illustrates market psychology 

One month ago, backwardation in Brent futures (front month minus second month) had fallen from $7/bbl to virtually nothing, reflecting the market’s belief that an end to the war was little more than a negotiating step away. It wasn’t. The resumption of attacks, coupled with Houthi involvement in the Red Sea, sent prices sharply higher again, with backwardation in the Brent futures market returning to almost $6/bbl. 

Jul 2026 Graph 02 1024x572 1

The halt in attacks over the past weekend has taken steam out of the market, with prices and backwardation falling sharply. Where we go from here depends if there is again a belief peace is on the horizon, or if this is another false dawn. The past month highlights how impossible it is to predict an ending to the war, and how fragile any expectations of peace can be. 

We cannot ignore the price, but still must look to the future

It is impossible to write a report and not highlight the turmoil of the current market and what is happening. However, we still must look beyond this, to see where we could end up. 

In an earlier report, we suggested the run-up to the US mid-term elections in November may be a backstop to the war. However, even this is not guaranteed. There are many dynamic elements to the economy and voter intentions, but one feature that will always crop up in the US is the gasoline price. This has risen from $3/gallon before the war to over $4/gallon for the past four months. 

Jul 2026 Graph 03 1024x570 1

If it comes to it, will Republican voters want to see a resolution to the war and a return to $3 gasoline prices ahead of the elections? 

We have a change of heart on how low bunker prices can go

We don’t know exact timings, but in any planning, we must look at what happens when the war does finally end and prices fall, whenever that may be. In past reports we have highlighted the view that Brent crude prices are unlikely to fall back to pre-war levels in the $60s, and Singapore VLSFO unlikely to go back in to the $400s. This may be the point at which these views change.

Previous thinking was based on a relatively short war, where there would be a large loss of oil supply and a massive stock-draw. In this case, tighter stock levels would be sufficient to keep prices higher than their pre-war levels once we returned to ‘normality’. This would mean Brent futures in the $70s (and not in the $60s), and Singapore VLSFO in the $500s, and not the $400s.

A number of mainstream analysts also held this view, although there were some that were lower and some higher.

Given the war has already gone on for much longer than almost everyone expected, this thinking must change. Yes, global stocks have been drawn down at a rapid rate, but this is slowing. Higher pricing and inflationary blows have had a major impact on global oil demand, with current indications that total oil demand in the second quarter of this year was some 4 million b/d lower than year earlier levels.

The graph below shows this sharp drop in demand and even if the war comes to an end relatively soon, and demand gets back towards some normality, a structural loss of more than 1 million b/d in global oil demand is still expected to have taken place because of the extended period of conflict.

If the war goes on for even longer, structural losses in global oil demand are likely to be even greater.

Jul 2026 Graph 04 1024x579 1

Source: US EIA

It’s a hard road, but we can get there

This means that once the war does end, market psychology will be looking at a rapid increase in oil supplies going into a global market which is much lower in demand.  This opens the way for prices to easily return to their pre-war levels of Brent in the $60s and Singapore VLSFO in the $400s. 

Now we just need those at the centre of negotiations to get us there.

 

Photo credit and source: Integr8 Fuels
Published: 30 July, 2026

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Bunker Fuel Quality

FOBAS report warns of growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

LR’s latest FOBAS Fuel Quality Report reveals that the biggest fuel quality risks are no longer confined to off-specification fuels, with some compliant fuels creating operational challenges.

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New FOBAS report warns growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

Classification society Lloyd’s Register (LR) on Tuesday (14 July) warned that ship operators are facing a growing risk from fuels that appear compliant under routine ISO 8217 testing but still present operational risks once onboard.

According to LR’s latest Fuel Oil Bunker Analysis and Advisory Service (FOBAS) Fuel Quality Report, covering the first half of 2026, off-specification fuels remain a persistent challenge. 

However, some of the most disruptive cases now involve fuels that pass routine compliance testing but show poor stability or compatibility, or contain non-conventional blend components that are only identified through more detailed investigative analysis.

Several incidents investigated highlighted this trend. In March and April, a number of vessels reported operational difficulties after bunkering fuel in a major bunkering hub. Further forensic analysis found that many of the fuels contained elevated concentrations of Estonian shale oil, in some cases estimated to be around 10-15%.

While shale oil is recognised within ISO 8217 as an acceptable blend component, FOBAS investigations found that higher concentrations can be associated with fuel instability and operational issues affecting filters, separators and fuel pumps.

The report also shows that fuel quality variability remains stubbornly high. Off-specification cases remained elevated throughout the first six months of 2026, suggesting that quality issues are no longer isolated events but a more persistent feature of today’s marine fuel supply chain.

The most common recurring issues included sulphur exceedances, excessive water content, sediment and stability problems, elevated catalytic fines, sodium contamination and low flash point distillate fuels.

At the same time, biofuels (especially FAME blends) are continuing to grow without being a primary source of quality issues. Where issues occurred in blended fuels, they were generally associated with the conventional VLSFO component rather than the FAME fraction.

The report concluded that operators will need to adopt a more proactive approach to fuel management as marine fuels become more diverse and fuel quality risks become harder to identify through routine compliance testing alone.

Greater emphasis on fuel stability, compatibility and understanding fuel composition will be critical to reducing operational disruption and maintaining vessel performance.

Murray Kirkwood, Fuel Specialist Consultant, Lloyd’s Register, said: “The findings from our latest report show that fuel quality risk is evolving. The challenge is no longer simply identifying fuels that fail specification. Increasingly, operators are encountering fuels that meet the required limits but still create operational difficulties once they are stored, handled and used onboard.

“As fuel blending becomes more complex, the distinction that matters is increasingly not between on-spec and off-spec fuel, but between fuels that are operationally resilient and fuels that are operationally fragile. Understanding that difference is becoming essential for shipowners and operators.”

The latest findings reinforced FOBAS’ long-standing view that effective fuel management increasingly depends on understanding fuel behaviour rather than relying solely on pass-or-fail specification testing.

By combining routine fuel quality monitoring with forensic investigation of operational incidents, FOBAS provides shipowners with a clearer understanding of emerging fuel quality risks as the industry continues its transition to a more diverse and complex fuel landscape.

Note: The FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel Quality Report H1 2026 is available at FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel quality reports | LR

 

Photo credit: Lloyd’s Register
Published: 15 July, 2026

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