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VPS: Crew safety endangered in the wake of bunker failures

Steve Bee and Captain Rahul Choudhuri highlight a case study involving a vessel’s crew and potentially others placed in great danger when the ship lost power and propulsion due to chemically contaminated fuel.

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Steve Bee, Group Marketing Director and Captain Rahul Choudhuri, President of Strategic Partnerships of marine fuels testing company VPS, on Tuesday (5 August) highlighted a case study involving a vessel’s crew and potentially others working on oil rig structures placed in great danger when the ship lost power and propulsion due to chemically contaminated fuel:

During February 2025, a prominent shipowner had one of its vessels bunker 405mt of VLSFO in New York. This case study highlights what happened next and the consequential dangers and costs contaminated marine fuel posed to the vessel, its crew and the owner.

The bunker was purchased against the ISO8217 specifications, yet the initial VPS laboratory test report, whilst showing the fuel met the ISO8217 specification, also indicated via CGMS-Headspace Screening, the presence of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the form of Indene and 4-Methylphenol. 

Following this finding, a more detailed forensic GCMS-Vacuum Distillation analysis was performed, which identified the presence of a number of chemical compounds not typically associated with marine fuels:

Screenshot 2025 08 06 at 2.19.17 PM

On the 27th February, VPS provided cautionary notes within this GCMS-VD report:

  • The Alkene and Styrene compounds were collectively present in substantial concentration and are known to cause sticking and seizure of fuel pumps plunger and barrel.
  • The Phenolic compounds were present in a disproportionately high concentration of 8782 ppm (0.88%). These compounds are known to cause sludge formation in fuel filters / separators and fuel injection issues.

However, despite VPS test results and advisory comments, for numerous reasons, the vessel had no other choice but to begin to use this fuel from 28th February and subsequently struggled to consume the bunker. As the vessel makes frequent calls to ECA-based ports, there is a regular requirement for fuel changeovers to occur, ie from VLSFO to LSMGO and vice versa.

However, with this specific VLSFO bunker, the vessel experienced excessive sludge formation in filters and purifiers, which forced the vessel to slow down or stop and perform several cycles of filter and purifier cleaning until the changeover in the system was complete.

On 3rd May the tank containing the above grade was stripped to allow for the next grade of VLSFO to be used. Within a few hours, whilst the last of contaminated bunkers were being used, all Main Engine plunger barrels seized, the purifiers clogged, and the filters (fine filter / jet filter/ transfer pump filter) were choked. It was noticed that an unusual and excessive plastic-like, hardened sludge, had formed and this inundated the settling / service tanks and sludge tanks. 

Screenshot 2025 08 06 at 2.19.32 PM

The vessel was subsequently without propulsion for over 3 days. It drifted from outside ECA waters close to fixed oil rig structures within the US Gulf region, as it tried to recover from the precarious situation. This posed a significant safety risk to the vessel and crew.

The after effects of this case continued for several days and involved the following:

  • A major emergency alert due to the loss of propulsion, necessitating the involvement of Qualified Individual (QI), USCG and tugs assistance to be on standby as a contingency measure for mobilisation, if necessary.
  • Several days of cleaning and clearing of filters/ purifiers/ pipelines and tanks.
  • Severe disruption to the rest hours of the crew with significant overtime incurred.
  • A financial burden on the owners due to the engagement of various shore workshops to clean sludge and tanks onboard while conducting full manual tank cleaning.
  • Considerable time and effort in reporting to Authorities, followed by Flag State and USCG Inspections.

Screenshot 2025 08 06 at 2.19.42 PM

In conclusion, this case study shows that considerable shipboard damage and work stress can be caused due to contaminated bunkers. It is also worth noting, following the final stripping of the fuel, the situation became even worse, indicating the contamination may well have settled in the lower part of the fuel. However, the far greater risk posed, was one of the safety of the crew and vessel, when the vessel became immobilized at sea due to such a bunker condition. On reflection, the consequences of this could quite easily have been even more disastrous & immeasurable, than they were.

 

Photo credit: VPS
Published: 6 August, 2025

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Bunker Fuel Quality

FOBAS report warns of growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

LR’s latest FOBAS Fuel Quality Report reveals that the biggest fuel quality risks are no longer confined to off-specification fuels, with some compliant fuels creating operational challenges.

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New FOBAS report warns growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

Classification society Lloyd’s Register (LR) on Tuesday (14 July) warned that ship operators are facing a growing risk from fuels that appear compliant under routine ISO 8217 testing but still present operational risks once onboard.

According to LR’s latest Fuel Oil Bunker Analysis and Advisory Service (FOBAS) Fuel Quality Report, covering the first half of 2026, off-specification fuels remain a persistent challenge. 

However, some of the most disruptive cases now involve fuels that pass routine compliance testing but show poor stability or compatibility, or contain non-conventional blend components that are only identified through more detailed investigative analysis.

Several incidents investigated highlighted this trend. In March and April, a number of vessels reported operational difficulties after bunkering fuel in a major bunkering hub. Further forensic analysis found that many of the fuels contained elevated concentrations of Estonian shale oil, in some cases estimated to be around 10-15%.

While shale oil is recognised within ISO 8217 as an acceptable blend component, FOBAS investigations found that higher concentrations can be associated with fuel instability and operational issues affecting filters, separators and fuel pumps.

The report also shows that fuel quality variability remains stubbornly high. Off-specification cases remained elevated throughout the first six months of 2026, suggesting that quality issues are no longer isolated events but a more persistent feature of today’s marine fuel supply chain.

The most common recurring issues included sulphur exceedances, excessive water content, sediment and stability problems, elevated catalytic fines, sodium contamination and low flash point distillate fuels.

At the same time, biofuels (especially FAME blends) are continuing to grow without being a primary source of quality issues. Where issues occurred in blended fuels, they were generally associated with the conventional VLSFO component rather than the FAME fraction.

The report concluded that operators will need to adopt a more proactive approach to fuel management as marine fuels become more diverse and fuel quality risks become harder to identify through routine compliance testing alone.

Greater emphasis on fuel stability, compatibility and understanding fuel composition will be critical to reducing operational disruption and maintaining vessel performance.

Murray Kirkwood, Fuel Specialist Consultant, Lloyd’s Register, said: “The findings from our latest report show that fuel quality risk is evolving. The challenge is no longer simply identifying fuels that fail specification. Increasingly, operators are encountering fuels that meet the required limits but still create operational difficulties once they are stored, handled and used onboard.

“As fuel blending becomes more complex, the distinction that matters is increasingly not between on-spec and off-spec fuel, but between fuels that are operationally resilient and fuels that are operationally fragile. Understanding that difference is becoming essential for shipowners and operators.”

The latest findings reinforced FOBAS’ long-standing view that effective fuel management increasingly depends on understanding fuel behaviour rather than relying solely on pass-or-fail specification testing.

By combining routine fuel quality monitoring with forensic investigation of operational incidents, FOBAS provides shipowners with a clearer understanding of emerging fuel quality risks as the industry continues its transition to a more diverse and complex fuel landscape.

Note: The FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel Quality Report H1 2026 is available at FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel quality reports | LR

 

Photo credit: Lloyd’s Register
Published: 15 July, 2026

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Bunker Fuel Quality

VPS on lifeboat fuel quality: A safety of life at sea critical risk

Neil Chapman and Steve Bee said regular fuel testing, correct fuel selection, and proactive fuel management are essential to ensure lifeboats are ready when they’re needed most.

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Neil Chapman, Managing Director of Americas, and Steve Bee, Group Marketing and Strategic Projects Director of marine fuels testing company VPS, on Monday (13 July) said regular fuel testing, correct fuel selection, and proactive fuel management are essential to ensure lifeboats are ready when they’re needed most: 

Performance when its most critical

In an emergency, a lifeboat engine is not simply a mechanical asset, it is a life-saving system. If the fuel in that system is of poor quality due to degradation, contamination, or simply unsuitable for the operating environment, then the result may be failure to launch, manoeuvre, or sustain operation, when human lives depend on it. Fuel failures in lifeboats onboard Cruise Liners are high-consequence life-safety risk as the engine may be the only power source available during an emergency. It is a key SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) requirement that lifeboats should hold sufficient fuel to enable them to run at 6 knots for no less than 25 hours.

The primary consequence of a lifeboat failure is not the commercial  loss, but the potential failure of a safety-critical system during an abandon-ship scenario. Financial, legal and reputational consequences will undoubtedly follow but the immediate risk is to life.

Now with the inclusion of Biofuels and FAME in the marine fuel mix and assuming the same fuel used in the main engines may be used in the emergency systems, how do you verify the operability of the lifeboats in times of crisis?

Fuel grade DMX within the ISO8217 specification is specifically intended for use within emergency equipment. However, since this is not a mandatory requirement, marine gas oil (MGO grade DMA) used for other purposes on board, is often used to fill up lifeboat fuel tanks. This could lead to hazardous outcomes as the DMA grade fuel might not be suitable for its intended use. DMA fuel whilst acceptable for general machinery use, will unlikely provide the same assurance of low-temperature operability, ignition quality, storage reliability, or starting reliability required for emergency craft. The quality of the fuel in the lifeboat tanks may also deteriorate during storage. Hence it is essential to test and ensure that the quality of the fuel being taken into the tanks is ’fit for purpose’ and monitored at regular intervals. DMX fuel should be chosen due to its ability to operate at a lower temperature, superior ignition quality and  improved starting capabilities. However, this fuel only accounts for approximately 1-2% of the global supply, compared to the regular DMA grade.

Failure Modes in Emergency Operations

SOLAS compliance should not be viewed only in terms of carrying the required quality of fuel. The fuel must also remain fit-for-purpose regarding stability, cleanliness and be capable of supporting reliable engine operation throughout the vessel’s operation. Lifeboat failures are rarely a singular dramatic event, rather a chain of events. These are typically caused by degraded fuel, filter blockages or storage issues.  Incorrect handling and storage can result in the ingress of water, which with modern fuels, can promote the growth of filter blocking bacteria rendering the engine inoperable.  So rather than the issue being no fuel, it is more likely to be an issue of fuel that is of poor quality. As lifeboat engines may sit idle for long periods it potentially allows the fuel to degrade, if the correct due care and attention is not paid to this key piece of emergency equipment.

The handling and storage of fuel, coupled with the observance of quality operating procedures can lessen the risk of these failures, but are unlikely to eliminate them completely. However, the failure to follow established procedures can result in issues that are likely to cause catastrophic financial and reputational damage to the cruise line operator.

The most common failure modes in emergency lifeboats can be categorised as follows:

  • Fuel Starvation
  • Contamination
  • Degraded Fuel
  • Blocked Filter/Injectors

Contamination in the engine due to the presence of water, as previously mentioned, can be catastrophic as this can induce corrosion and oxidation, along with promoting microbial growth which results in filter blocking and fuel starvation to the engine.

If an engine fails to start, or runs poorly under load, due to fuel related issues this would likely cause a secondary emergency, compounding the reason the lifeboat was required in the first instance.

The danger with degraded fuel is that the risk is often hidden. A lifeboat may appear available, inspected and compliant, whilst he fuel inside its tank is steadily losing the properties required for reliable emergency operation.

IMO guidelines indicate that inspectors and regulators are increasingly looking at emergency systems for fuel compliance, highlighting its importance in the operation of a vessel.

Seasonal & Regional Fuel Requirements

Often overlooked are the cold flow properties of diesel and biofuels.  While hydrocarbon-based diesel has very good (low temperature) cold flow properties, this is not the case for biofuels, so lifeboats fuelled in the Caribbean for the summer season may be completely inoperable if the vessels are transferred to the Northeast or higher location, for a winter period.

Root Cause Failure Mechanisms

The failure to follow the appropriate standards which result in engine failure can be categorised as follows:

image 45

The Effect of Biofuels on Marine Fuel Quality

In a study recently completed by a major shipping line, blends of biofuels were tested for a wide range of parameters.  The findings were:

Biological growth appeared within the first month, increasing rapidly with exposure to light.

Within 3 months oxidative corrosion started to occur requiring regular monitoring.

46 CFR § 169.837 states:

“(2) The fuel tanks of motor propelled lifeboats have been emptied, and fuel changed once every twelve months.”

Yet the evidence shows fuel stability effectively starts to deteriorate within the first month and can be unusable by month 3.

Prevention Strategy

Fuel testing should be viewed as part of the vessel’s safety assurance programme. It provides evidence that the lifeboat fuel remains fit-for-purpose, not only on the day it was supplied, but throughout storage and across changing operational conditions. A strong housekeeping policy requires a multi-pronged approach to ensure operability in times of crisis; such steps include:

  • Housekeeping – ensuring the fuel system remains closed when not in use to eliminate the ingress of water.
  • Operation – frequently run the engines so that fuel and lubricants are cycled through the units.
  • Testing program – likely to be cheaper and more efficient than changing out the fuel. A well-developed fuel testing program can eliminate the need to change the fuel.
  • Documentation – by recording all the actions taken to protect the emergency systems historic data can be tracked.

Advanced Testing Programs

Due to the importance of these emergency assets several different tests should be considered to ensure the suitability of the fuel.  Testing should include:

  • Cold-Flow properties using Pour Point, Cold Filter plugging Point, Cloud Point
  • Water content for moisture
  • BYF for Microbial testing
  • Acid Number for corrosion tendencies
  • FAME for biofuels content
  • Sulphur for MARPOL Annex VI compliance
  • Visual Appearance
  • Viscosity for flow properties
  • Density
  • Flash Point for SOLAS compliance
  • Cetane Index

Conclusion

It is possible to avoid engine failures, but this can only be achieved with a well-documented and well-followed operating procedure.  Regular fuel sampling and testing along with general good housekeeping techniques will ensure these units are ready go when they are most needed. Once they are seen as an active safety-critical asset rather than a dormant emergency component the value in this process will be realized.

Lifeboat fuel quality is not a housekeeping detail, it is a Safety of Life at Sea issue. Emergency craft must be capable of starting manoeuvring and operating for the required duration whenever called upon. Sub-standard, degraded, contaminated, or unsuitable fuel can compromise that capability and turn an emergency response into a secondary emergency. Regular testing, correct fuel choice, controlled storage and documented fuel management provide the evidence and assurance that lifeboats remain ready when lives depend on them.

 

Photo credit: VPS
Published: 14 July, 2026

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Bunker Fuel Quality

Fuel quality issues drive 50% rise in bunker claims, says Gard

Gard says bunker-related claims increased significantly in between January and May 2026, with over 70 cases recorded – a 50% rise compared to 2025 and notes that most claims involve fuel quality.

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Maritime protection and indemnity (P&I) club Gard on Friday (19 June) released a report on practical observations from recent cases of bunker-related claims, highlighting recurring challenges and essential considerations for managing fuel quality issues effectively:

Key findings

  • Sharp rise in bunker claims and geopolitics: Bunker-related claims increased significantly in early 2026, with over 70 cases recorded – a 50% rise compared to 2025. Most claims involved fuel quality, with a noticeable uptick following the escalation of the Middle East conflict.
  • Global risk profile with concentration driven by supply volumes: Bunker quality incidents were recorded worldwide, reflecting a broadly dispersed and global risk environment rather than a localized issue. Higher numbers of claims at major hubs such as Singapore, Houston, and ARA mainly reflect their large bunkering volumes
  • VLSFO remains the primary source of claims: Very Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (VLSFO) accounts for the vast majority of bunker quality claims. Its complex blended nature increases the likelihood of variability and contamination, making it more prone to quality issues. This reinforces that VLSFO continues to be the key technical risk area in marine fuel usage.
  • ISO 8217 compliance does not guarantee fuel suitability: A significant proportion of cases involved fuels that met ISO 8217 Table 2 parameters but still caused operational issues and damage to machinery. This underscores the growing importance of Clause 5, which focuses on whether fuel is fit for use and free from harmful substances. Standard testing alone is often insufficient, requiring more advanced analysis to identify problematic contaminants.
  • Claims are driven by both technical and contractual challenges: Bunker disputes are often complex due to misaligned contractual relationships between owners, charterers, and suppliers. Issues related to binding sample, parameter(s) to be tested, time bars and evidentiary requirements frequently complicate claims resolution.
  • Operational impact is often underestimated compared to headline casualties: While no major casualties were directly linked to poor fuel in this dataset, several vessels were disabled or required towage. These incidents can create high exposure when occurring in congested or coastal waters. The absence of catastrophic outcomes should not obscure the underlying operational risk.

This report draws on Gard’s claims data from the first five months of 2026, with additional data contributions from VPS.

Note: The full report titled ‘Beyond Specification: Bunker claims insights in early 2026’ can be found here

 

Photo credit: Shaah Shahidh on Unsplash
Published: 22 June, 2026

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