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IBIA: The end of the world as we know it

Unni Einemo provides clarification on the HFO carriage ban, and updates readers on the 2020 fuel spec change, Arctic HFO ban, and IMO GHG strategy for 2050.

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The following article is written by Unni Einemo of the International Bunker Industry Association (IBIA):

The world of bunkers is heading for rapid and fundamental changes and not just because of the 0.50% sulphur cap in 2020. While IMO and stakeholders are working hard to deal with this unprecedented global fuel specification change, discussions have moved on to just how soon we should phase out the use of fossil fuels altogether.

By the time you read this, the key outcomes of the 72nd session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee will have been well publicised, but not necessarily well understood. Misunderstandings have been rife with regards to what the approval of a carriage ban of fuel oil exceeding 0.50% sulphur actually means. Has it changed anything? And what does it mean if the IMO agrees to ban the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil (HFO) as bunkers in the Arctic? And how on earth can we cut CO2 emissions from global shipping by at least 50% by 2050 to keep the world safe from catastrophic climate change?

Carriage ban set for adoption
As expected, MEPC 72 agreed to amendments to MARPOL Annex VI to prohibit the carriage of bunkers above 0.50% sulphur in bunker tanks on ships. It is set for adoption at MEPC 73, which should allow it to take effect on 1 March, 2020. The intention of this regulatory change is clear and simple, but has lent itself to a surprising amount of misinterpretation.

The only thing that has actually changed is that the text of MARPOL Annex VI now prohibits not just the use of bunkers above 0.50% sulphur content, but also makes it an offence for ships to carry it in their fuel tanks. Nothing else is new. From January 1, 2020, only ships with an approved “equivalent arrangement” such as scrubbers are allowed to use high sulphur fuel oil (HSFO) and from March 1, 2020 they will also be the only ships allowed to keep HSFO in their bunker tanks.

Strangely, some think the carriage ban means all ships, even those without scrubbers, can carry on buying and using HSFO until 1 March 2020.  The reality, however, is that while all ships can still legally carry it until 1 March 2020, seeing as they are not allowed to use it after January 1, why would they?

Another common misunderstanding is that the carriage ban could prevent ships with scrubbers from carrying HSFO, or for ships to carry it as cargo. Neither is true, but it’s easy to see how semantics could give rise to such beliefs. Part of the problem is that MARPOL Annex VI is split into separate parts which are interlinked, but the links between them aren’t explicitly spelled out. The one we know best is Regulation 14, which, following the amendment to include a carriage ban, should read as follows from 1 March 2020: “The sulphur content of fuel oil used or carried for use on board a ship shall not exceed 0.50% m/m.”

Other parts of MARPOL Annex VI deal with the exemptions from this general requirement. Scrubbers are allowed under Regulation 4 on equivalent means of compliance. Any ship with a scrubber will have this reflected its International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate. Moreover, it is possible for a ship to be given an exemption to conduct trials for sulphur emission reduction and control technology research under regulation 3.2 of MARPOL Annex VI.

There could also easily be semantic misunderstandings about what fuel oil actually means. In the global commodity market “fuel oil” is typically understood to refer to residual fuel oil from refineries, which is also the main ingredient in most bunker fuel today. In IMO-speak, however, it is defined in Regulation 2.9 of MARPOL Annex VI as follows: “Fuel Oil means any fuel delivered to and intended for combustion purposes for propulsion or operation on board a ship, including distillate and residual fuels.”

Hence, when IMO regulations talk about fuel oil, it is only talking about fuel intended for combustion purposes, or bunkers. This does not include fuel oil carried as cargo. However, at MEPC 72, IBIA co-sponsored a document with IPIECA to ensure the regulatory text amendment would not unintentionally prevent bunker barges from carrying HSFO for delivery to ships with scrubbers. Originally, the text proposed for approval read: “The sulphur content of any fuel oil used or carried for use on board ships shall not exceed 0.50% m/m.” IPIECA and IBIA pointed out that this could be read as not allowing bunker barges to carry high sulphur bunker products as this would in fact be “fuel oil for use on ships”. Our proposal received strong support as the need for a clear, unambiguous text was recognised, and the text eventually agreed specifies “fuel oil used or carried for use on board a ship,” which should prevent the interpretation from including bunkers carried as cargo.

So, if the carriage ban changes nothing regarding what ships should be doing to comply with the 0.50% sulphur limit, why bother? The purpose is to enable more effective enforcement of the 2020 sulphur cap and hence reduce the risk that operators will be tempted to cheat and gain a competitive advantage. It means port State authorities only need to prove carriage of non-compliant bunkers, whereas the current regulatory text means they would have to prove that it has been used in their jurisdiction in order for them to be able to sanction the ship.

Unprecedented fuel spec change
Global marine fuel test data provided to the IMO’s sulphur monitoring programme are reported MEPC annually. They hint at the magnitude of the change that will need to happen in the global bunker supply chain in 2020. Test data for 2017 showed that only 1.61% of the residual fuels tested in 2017 were below 0.50%, while a further 3.25% of the samples tested in the 0.50% to 1.00% sulphur range. This suggests that supply of residual fuel meeting the upcoming 0.50% sulphur limit without significant blending is very limited. By contrast, prior to the global limit falling from 4.5% to 3.50% sulphur, only 13% of all residual fuels in the IMO sulphur monitoring programme tested above the new limit versus close to 98% at present.

There’s no such issue with marine distillates, where 95.02% of the tested fuel was below 0.10% sulphur content, meaning the vast majority of distillate fuels supplied at present meets the emission control area (ECA) sulphur limit.

However, the IMO sulphur monitoring report also shows that the volume of residual fuels tested was 10 times that of distillate fuels, so come 2020, the vast majority of fuels supplied today will have to be replaced with fuels that are much lower in sulphur. That will be quite an undertaking in the supply chain and we will likely see many unfamiliar blends as the market strives to find the most cost-effective fuel solutions.

MEPC 72 also heard that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has been given the green light to develop a Publicly Available Specification (PAS) in response to a request from the IMO to provide an ISO standard that can better reflect the quality of fuels with no more than 0.50% sulphur. Work is underway on PAS 23263: “Guidelines for fuel suppliers and users regarding marine fuel quality considering the implementation of maximum 0.50%S in 2020” and looks like it will be ready by the end 2019. The intention of PAS 23263 is to provide detailed guidance to fuel suppliers and users on the type of fuel blends that are anticipated to dominate the global bunker market in 2020.

Arctic HFO ban on the cards
MEPC 72 agreed that work will begin to develop a ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil (HFO) for combustion purposes by ships in Arctic waters, but first it needs to define what is meant by ‘HFO’. Fuel blends complying with the upcoming 0.50% sulphur limit may contain both distillate and HFO blend components, so it will be critical to have a clear definition.

A group of countries put forward a proposal to ban HFO use and carriage as fuel by all ships to which MARPOL applies when operating in Arctic waters no later than 2021, with a five-year delay in implementation for ships that have fuel tank protections in place. The ban would not apply to HFO carried as cargo.

The proposal was resisted by some countries which were ready to identify measures to reduce and mitigate the risk of HFO fuel spills, but not a carriage ban. There was also discussion on the potential impact of such a ban on maritime trade, in particular on Arctic communities and economies. MEPC 72 agreed that this should be assessed before adopting a future ban.

MEPC 72 agreed on the scope of work for the Sub-committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR), which meets for its 6th session in February 2019. PPR 6 has been tasked to develop a definition of HFO; prepare a set of guidelines on mitigation measures to reduce risks of use and carriage of heavy fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters; and on the basis of an assessment of the impacts, develop a ban on HFO for use and carriage as fuel by ships in Arctic waters, on an appropriate timescale.

It has been widely reported that the use and carriage of HFO is already banned in the Antarctic (including as cargo). This is not strictly speaking correct: the Antarctic ban in Regulation 43 of MARPOL Annex I applies to heavy grade oil (HGO), which is defined as follows:

.1 crude oils having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3 ;
.2 oils, other than crude oils, having a density at 15°C higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at  50°C higher than 180 mm2/s; or
.3 bitumen, tar and their emulsions

PPR 6 has been instructed to take Regulation 43 of MARPOL Annex I into account when developing a definition of HFO. The key would be .2 in Regulation 43 (above).

The current HGO ban in the Antarctic means all the marine fuel grades meeting current ISO 8217 marine distillate (DM) specifications would be allowed for carriage and use. Residual grades (RM), although several of them have a kinematic viscosity at 50°C below 180 cSt, all have a maximum density limit in excess of 900 kg/m3, which would not be allowed.

With extensive blending of various components anticipated to meet the 0.50% sulphur limit in 2020, it is anticipated that many blends classified as RM products will have viscosity below 180 cSt. Density may also be lower than we see for most RM grades today, though it seems unlikely that fuels designated as RM would be below the 900 kg/m3 at 15°C threshold.

If the IMO agrees to use the current HGO definition for the Antarctic ban to define what constitutes ‘HFO’, density would become the key differentiator between fuels that can be used or carried for use in the Polar regions and those that would be banned. Ships equipped with scrubbers would still be able to transit Polar waters, but only if they empty out HFO from all their fuel tanks first, rendering scrubbers rather obsolete in Polar regions.

GHG: The beginning of the end
The heat was on for MEPC 72 to adopt an initial IMO strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. The world was watching. There were almost daily demonstrations outside and a warning emblazoned across the embankment of the River Thames facing the building: “IMO Don’t Sink Paris”.

MEPC 72 was preceded by an intersessional working group (WG) to develop a draft text to be finalised by the Committee. It was clear that consensus would not come easy, but after two weeks of tough negotiations, during which many countries set out incompatible positions threatening to undermine the chances of arriving at an agreement, a compromise text was adopted. This sends a strong signal about the IMO’s commitment to phasing out greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping as soon as possible, consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals.

The agreed overall “level of ambition” to reduce the sector’s total GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 levels was the most hotly contested point. It was viewed as far too weak for many, while a large number of countries objected to defining a figure at this stage as they felt it is premature and not based on evidence.

Addressing MEPC 72 toward the end of the week, IMO Secretary-General Kitack Lim encouraged member states to adopt the compromise text although, as he conceded, it may not be completely satisfactory to everyone. Failing to adopt the Initial IMO GHG Strategy was “not an option,” he stressed, reminding the Committee that the Initial Strategy is a key starting point; it is not the final outcome.

IMO has agreed to present a revised GHG Strategy in 2023, when it has data from its mandatory fuel consumption data collection and a new IMO GHG Study to better define shipping’s actual contribution to global GHG emissions.

The Initial IMO GHG Strategy includes a vision statement: “IMO remains committed to reducing GHG emissions from international shipping and, as a matter of urgency, aims to phase them out as soon as possible in this century.” It sets out objectives highlighting IMO’s role in addressing GHG emissions and identifying what actions to take, while supporting the continued development of global trade and maritime transport services. The controversial “levels of ambition” include not just the overall “at least 50%” sector reduction goal by 2050, but also a stated aim to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping, by at least 40% by 2030, pursuing efforts towards 70% by 2050, compared to 2008.

The strategy also contains a list of “candidate short-, mid- and long term further measures with possible timelines and their impact on states” to be further developed. These start off with technical and operational energy efficiency measures, before transitioning to low-carbon and eventually zero-carbon fuels.
The purpose is to make sure international shipping contributes its fair share in the global effort to keep climate change in check by limiting temperature rises to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to keep them to no more than 1.5°C. If this fails, the world as we know it could change dramatically and for some of the Pacific island states represented at the IMO, due to rising sea levels, it would literally mean the end.

To achieve this aim, however, the use of fossil fuels would have to be phased out completely and replaced with carbon neutral energy sources. Just what the fuels of the future might be is not yet clear. We are a long way away as current supply of carbon-neutral options and technologies fall well short of global energy demand.

The lyrics of 1987 hit from the rock band R.E.M. concludes: “It’s the end of the world as we know it, and I feel fine.” The task ahead of us, then, is to find the energy solutions that will make us feel fine. That means the end of the world as we know it for oil-based bunkers.

Published: 3 September, 2018
 

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Bunker Fuel

Alkagesta highlights key insights on European choke point pressures in August

Update covers dual supply crisis currently shaping global bunker markets — a stalled Strait of Hormuz peace process and Rhine water levels at a 140-year record low — and the implications for Singapore.

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Alkagesta

Malta-based global commodity trading house Alkagesta recently shared latest market insight examining the dual supply crisis gripping global energy markets as diplomatic efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz stall and Rhine water levels fall to record lows, creating what the company describes as a “state of emergency” for European inland fuel distribution.

In an article published on Alkagesta Market Insights on 11 August, the company’s trading and market intelligence teams outlined how the convergence of two simultaneous logistical crises is tightening prompt fuel availability across Singapore, Northwest Europe, and the Mediterranean:

Strait of Hormuz transits fell to a near-one-month low of 13 ships on August 9 following an attack on an ADNOC-linked tanker, as both the US and Iran demand war reparations before any reopening agreement can be reached. Simultaneously, Rhine water levels at the Kaub chokepoint fell to 16 cm on August 10 — the lowest since records began in 1880 — with forecasts pointing to a further drop to just 4 cm by August 14, effectively halting barge traffic and trapping fuel oil stocks at the ARA hub.

The supply picture across both key hubs has deteriorated sharply. In Singapore, Middle Eastern fuel oil imports nearly tripled week-over-week to 328,878 mt by July 29 — the highest volume since March — providing some relief as onshore commercial heavy distillate stocks rose to a five-week high of 19.58 million barrels by August 5. However, July bunker fuel sales are estimated to have fallen 3.7% month-over-month to 4.44 million mt, with elevated premiums redirecting prompt demand toward alternative ports including Zhoushan and Port Klang.

In Europe, the VLSFO market remains acutely undersupplied as refiners continue to prioritize high-margin diesel over low-sulfur blending components, while the Rhine crisis has forced barges to operate at just 15–20% of normal capacity — with freight rates from Rotterdam to Karlsruhe rising more than 400% in two months.

Alkagesta’s strategic outlook points to a potential total breakdown in Rhine-linked inland distribution by mid-August, a VLSFO Hi-5 spread likely to remain above $200/mt through Q3, and a global crude market that analysts warn requires an additional 2.1 million b/d for 18 months to rebuild depleted inventories.

Note: The full article can be read here.

 

Photo credit: Alkagesta
Published: 17 August, 2026

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Bunker Fuel

Integr8 Fuels: Why bunker markets could be lower than we thought

Marine fuel prices could prove lower than previously anticipated as easing refinery margins and improving bunker market fundamentals outweigh a still-uncertain crude oil outlook, says Integr8 Fuels.

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By Steve Christy, Expert Contributor, Integr8 Fuels

29 July 2026

We have just seen one false dawn, is there another to come? 

Last month, we wrote about how close we were to the expected lows in Brent and Rotterdam bunker prices, but not yet Singapore. Given what has happened since, a month is not only a long time in politics, but also a very long time in the bunker market. 

There was a resumption of attacks in the Arabian Gulf region on 13 July, followed by targeted Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea oil infrastructure and shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb region, the gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. As a result, Brent futures fell to lows of around $70/bbl in late June and early July before surging to a high of $100/bbl on 23 July. Over the same period, Singapore VLSFO fell to $635/mt before climbing to $865/mt, a swing of $230/mt in just 16 days. 

Jul 2026 Graph 01 1024x613 1

Prices at the start of this week fell sharply after a halt in Arabian Gulf attacks over the weekend, with front month Brent was down to intra-day lows of $84/bbl, and Singapore VLSFO $750/mt.  However, at the time of writing there has been a ‘surprise’ attack by Iran, and retaliatory action by the US, with prices rising again.  It looks like we could be at another false dawn. 

The obvious questions are: will there be a return to peace negotiations, and are we close to the end of the war and free-flowing traffic through the strait of Hormuz (and also the Bab el-Mandeb)? The obvious answer is, we don’t know; there are only a few people that are likely to know the answer to this. All we can do is plan for every eventuality. 

Low stocks, higher bunker prices, and a strong Singapore VLSFO premium: it’s a challenge 

For those of us in the bunker market, the point we made last month about Singapore VLSFO trading at a strong premium to crude still holds, albeit slightly less pronounced. The loss of supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, together with the added uncertainty surrounding Saudi product exports from the Jizan and Rabigh refineries on the Red Sea, has sustained this premium. 

These developments are likely to keep the Singapore VLSFO premium to crude at elevated levels until there is greater confidence that Middle East crude and product supplies are returning to more normal trading patterns. Amid all the price volatility, this Singapore VLSFO premium remains a key indicator to watch. 

Backwardation in Brent futures illustrates market psychology 

One month ago, backwardation in Brent futures (front month minus second month) had fallen from $7/bbl to virtually nothing, reflecting the market’s belief that an end to the war was little more than a negotiating step away. It wasn’t. The resumption of attacks, coupled with Houthi involvement in the Red Sea, sent prices sharply higher again, with backwardation in the Brent futures market returning to almost $6/bbl. 

Jul 2026 Graph 02 1024x572 1

The halt in attacks over the past weekend has taken steam out of the market, with prices and backwardation falling sharply. Where we go from here depends if there is again a belief peace is on the horizon, or if this is another false dawn. The past month highlights how impossible it is to predict an ending to the war, and how fragile any expectations of peace can be. 

We cannot ignore the price, but still must look to the future

It is impossible to write a report and not highlight the turmoil of the current market and what is happening. However, we still must look beyond this, to see where we could end up. 

In an earlier report, we suggested the run-up to the US mid-term elections in November may be a backstop to the war. However, even this is not guaranteed. There are many dynamic elements to the economy and voter intentions, but one feature that will always crop up in the US is the gasoline price. This has risen from $3/gallon before the war to over $4/gallon for the past four months. 

Jul 2026 Graph 03 1024x570 1

If it comes to it, will Republican voters want to see a resolution to the war and a return to $3 gasoline prices ahead of the elections? 

We have a change of heart on how low bunker prices can go

We don’t know exact timings, but in any planning, we must look at what happens when the war does finally end and prices fall, whenever that may be. In past reports we have highlighted the view that Brent crude prices are unlikely to fall back to pre-war levels in the $60s, and Singapore VLSFO unlikely to go back in to the $400s. This may be the point at which these views change.

Previous thinking was based on a relatively short war, where there would be a large loss of oil supply and a massive stock-draw. In this case, tighter stock levels would be sufficient to keep prices higher than their pre-war levels once we returned to ‘normality’. This would mean Brent futures in the $70s (and not in the $60s), and Singapore VLSFO in the $500s, and not the $400s.

A number of mainstream analysts also held this view, although there were some that were lower and some higher.

Given the war has already gone on for much longer than almost everyone expected, this thinking must change. Yes, global stocks have been drawn down at a rapid rate, but this is slowing. Higher pricing and inflationary blows have had a major impact on global oil demand, with current indications that total oil demand in the second quarter of this year was some 4 million b/d lower than year earlier levels.

The graph below shows this sharp drop in demand and even if the war comes to an end relatively soon, and demand gets back towards some normality, a structural loss of more than 1 million b/d in global oil demand is still expected to have taken place because of the extended period of conflict.

If the war goes on for even longer, structural losses in global oil demand are likely to be even greater.

Jul 2026 Graph 04 1024x579 1

Source: US EIA

It’s a hard road, but we can get there

This means that once the war does end, market psychology will be looking at a rapid increase in oil supplies going into a global market which is much lower in demand.  This opens the way for prices to easily return to their pre-war levels of Brent in the $60s and Singapore VLSFO in the $400s. 

Now we just need those at the centre of negotiations to get us there.

 

Photo credit and source: Integr8 Fuels
Published: 30 July, 2026

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Bunker Fuel Quality

FOBAS report warns of growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

LR’s latest FOBAS Fuel Quality Report reveals that the biggest fuel quality risks are no longer confined to off-specification fuels, with some compliant fuels creating operational challenges.

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New FOBAS report warns growing operational risks from ISO-compliant bunker fuels

Classification society Lloyd’s Register (LR) on Tuesday (14 July) warned that ship operators are facing a growing risk from fuels that appear compliant under routine ISO 8217 testing but still present operational risks once onboard.

According to LR’s latest Fuel Oil Bunker Analysis and Advisory Service (FOBAS) Fuel Quality Report, covering the first half of 2026, off-specification fuels remain a persistent challenge. 

However, some of the most disruptive cases now involve fuels that pass routine compliance testing but show poor stability or compatibility, or contain non-conventional blend components that are only identified through more detailed investigative analysis.

Several incidents investigated highlighted this trend. In March and April, a number of vessels reported operational difficulties after bunkering fuel in a major bunkering hub. Further forensic analysis found that many of the fuels contained elevated concentrations of Estonian shale oil, in some cases estimated to be around 10-15%.

While shale oil is recognised within ISO 8217 as an acceptable blend component, FOBAS investigations found that higher concentrations can be associated with fuel instability and operational issues affecting filters, separators and fuel pumps.

The report also shows that fuel quality variability remains stubbornly high. Off-specification cases remained elevated throughout the first six months of 2026, suggesting that quality issues are no longer isolated events but a more persistent feature of today’s marine fuel supply chain.

The most common recurring issues included sulphur exceedances, excessive water content, sediment and stability problems, elevated catalytic fines, sodium contamination and low flash point distillate fuels.

At the same time, biofuels (especially FAME blends) are continuing to grow without being a primary source of quality issues. Where issues occurred in blended fuels, they were generally associated with the conventional VLSFO component rather than the FAME fraction.

The report concluded that operators will need to adopt a more proactive approach to fuel management as marine fuels become more diverse and fuel quality risks become harder to identify through routine compliance testing alone.

Greater emphasis on fuel stability, compatibility and understanding fuel composition will be critical to reducing operational disruption and maintaining vessel performance.

Murray Kirkwood, Fuel Specialist Consultant, Lloyd’s Register, said: “The findings from our latest report show that fuel quality risk is evolving. The challenge is no longer simply identifying fuels that fail specification. Increasingly, operators are encountering fuels that meet the required limits but still create operational difficulties once they are stored, handled and used onboard.

“As fuel blending becomes more complex, the distinction that matters is increasingly not between on-spec and off-spec fuel, but between fuels that are operationally resilient and fuels that are operationally fragile. Understanding that difference is becoming essential for shipowners and operators.”

The latest findings reinforced FOBAS’ long-standing view that effective fuel management increasingly depends on understanding fuel behaviour rather than relying solely on pass-or-fail specification testing.

By combining routine fuel quality monitoring with forensic investigation of operational incidents, FOBAS provides shipowners with a clearer understanding of emerging fuel quality risks as the industry continues its transition to a more diverse and complex fuel landscape.

Note: The FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel Quality Report H1 2026 is available at FOBAS Fuel Insight: Fuel quality reports | LR

 

Photo credit: Lloyd’s Register
Published: 15 July, 2026

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